Argument Against Wake, Spencer And Fowler's Mitsiotemporal Theory

This paper critically evaluates an argument against Wake, Spencer & Fowler’s (2007) spatiotemporal theory because the objection confuses the hole’s identity with the exact region of space it occupies. The objection claims that holes are only identified with the specific region of space they occupy regardless of the greater relationship with the surrounding matter (Wake, Spencer & Fowler, 2007). Since the spatiotemporal theory identifies holes as spatial regions that belong to a larger object however, holes should not be identified as the spatial regions themselves without referring to the entire assembly. We will show that the author’s misconception leads to an unsound argument against the spatiotemporal theory.
The objection to Wake, Spencer & Fowler’s (2007) spatiotemporal theory can be casually depicted by the following scenario. Suppose a rich man paid his mechanic to install a muffler for his custom sports car, but he did not specify which side of the bumper he prefers. In this case, the mechanic can either install the muffler on the right or left side of the vehicle. If we suppose that he

The spatiotemporal theory’s criteria for identifying holes consider them as the smaller, empty region of space that belongs to the larger entity surrounding it (Wake, Spencer & Fowler, 2007). Since the smaller space enclosed by the larger object’s hole lining is an absence, it does not possess any identifying properties on its own other than its current spatial coordinates. As a result, it is impossible under the assumption that the spatiotemporal theory is true to identify a hole without referring to its location since it is the only distinguishable property it possesses. Consequently, holes should be identified with its distinct location because it is the only property that can be critically