Authoritarian Regime

After the downfall of the authoritarian regime, a period of transition follows where crucial tasks ranging from developing a new constitution and reappraising the authoritarian past must be dealt with (Pridham 2000: 19). Pridham defines transition as commencing at the “point when the previous authoritarian/totalitarian system begins to collapse and leading to a situation when, with the new constitution in place, the operation of the new political structures can start to be routinized” (ibid). While the Polish transition is defined as a transplacement because of the joint role played by the government and the opposition, the Greek transition took the form of a replacement as opposition groups took the lead in bringing about democracy (Huntington

While in Poland, the Council of Europe was active in conditioning elite strategies regarding the torturer problem because of its particular interest in ensuring peaceful democratic transitions in post-communist states on the continent, there was little influence of this kind in Greece. The first democratically elected Prime-minister of Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was not in favour of imposing criminal charges on the previous regime however successive governments continued to struggle over the difficulties of dealing with its communist past. Specifically access to information about the backgrounds of representatives, officials and authority figures has taken a prominent place in much of the public debate; this resonates with a sense of incompleteness of the transition process and the issues of the torturer problem (Szczerbiach 2016: 227). Although this was dealt with by internal actors, it is important to note their actions were somewhat conditioned by the Council of Europe, who outlined in their 1996 resolution the importance of “striking a delicate balance of providing justice without seeking revenge” (Parliamentary Assembly, 1996). Significantly the first lustration legislation was passed in 1997 in compliance with this resolution. In Greece however elite strategy was of primary importance; it was Karamanlis’s cautious and gradual strategy regarding the accountability of the Junta’s leadership which ensured little material escalation of recrimination and divisive tensions during the uncertain transition period (Verney & Couloumbis 1991: 115). Unlike Kwasniewski, Karamanlis was not constrained by conditions set out by the Council of Europe; his strategy of capitalising on popular support, and limiting the purge to “Junta principals conducted under regular legal procedures” in civilian courts, prevented any backlash from the