Compare And Contrast A Functionalist Reply To The Inverted Spectrum Argument

A functionalist reply to the Inverted Spectrum Argument

Jingshu Meng

Since the mid to late 20th century, functionalism gained enormous traction as a newly emerging theory of mind. Before functionalism, the two main competing theories are the dualist and materialist accounts of the mind. Dualism contends the mind is a nonphysical substance. Materialism, on the other hand, claims all mental states are in principle physical states. Both theories face various difficulties. Functionalism as a third alternative accounts for different information processing systems that possess the appropriate level of abstraction regardless of their physical makeup. So under this picture, other species or computers may have mental states if they have the right functional

In response to Block, I will raise a potential reply a Psychofunctionalist could take.

Before our discussion of the inverted spectrum argument, allow me to clarify Block’s target. Broadly speaking, functionalism is a family of theories that identifies mental states by their causal relation to stimuli, other mental states, and behaviors. According to functionalism, to be in a certain mental state is to have a disposition to act and have certain mental states (outputs) given some sensory inputs and mental states (inputs). To give a simplified example, suppose I accidentally touched a hot stove, experienced pain, and winced. According to a functionalist account, for me to be in a state of pain is to say that I am in a state in which the sensory inputs (i.e. the heat from the stove) inflicted some bodily injury (i.e. burning of the skin), and caused me to have some other mental states (i.e. the realization that I’ve been burned, the feeling that I’m upset, and the thought that I should immerse my hand in

Recall one major difference between Functionalism and Psychofunctionalism: a Psychofunctionalist is allowed to have an internal specification of inputs and outputs whereas the Functionalist can only have externally observable common sense knowledge as inputs and outputs. This allows a Psychofunctionalist to say that X does not have the same output as people with normal color vision, hence he is not functionally normal. Allow me to explain. There is an abundance of psychological studies conducted through empirical experimentation that show the effects of colors on people’s moods, emotions, and other psychological functioning. For example, one study conducted experiments on a total of 290 participants and found statistically significant differences in the participants’ perception in response to virtual rooms of different color schemes. In particular, the study showed that warm colors are seen as stimulating, arousing, and exciting. In contrast, cool colors were associated with feelings of calmness, restfulness, and spaciousness. Another study showed that in an achievement context, a glimpse of red evokes avoidance motivation, and undermines intellectual performance. Such studies have been widely used in fields like marketing, UI/UX design, interior design, etc. Although there isn’t a consensus on which hypothesis best explains the phenomenon,