Complementarity In The Rome Statute

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Chapter 3: Complementarity Section 1: Introduction The legal framework for complementarity as referenced in the Rome Statute is set out in art. 1, 17 and 20 of the Statute. The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute is one of the highlights of the Statute as it regulates and addresses a very profound question that usually arises in situations where one judicial entity fulfils functions, that can be fulfilled or in actual fact fulfilled by another judicial entity. The question that arises in this regard revolves around the governance of the mutual relationship and interaction, between both entities. This question of institutional relations equally applies to the relationship and interaction between, international and internationalized …show more content…

Models for allocating adjudicative competences Relative to the relationship and interaction between international or internationalized court/tribunals and domestic criminal courts, a number of generic models for allocating adjudicative function are conceivable. Both layers can relate to each other either through a system of mutual exclusivity or through a system of shared adjudicative function . Both systems are analysed in the sections below. Section 2.1. Mutual exclusivity …show more content…

This typology of institution interaction is bifurcated in that two alternate principles delineate the shared competence. Within the context of the first principle the exercise of jurisdiction by a domestic court is made contingent on the absent of adjudication by an international legal entity. Such, was the case, as regards the relationship between the ICTY and ICTR and the domestic criminal jurisdictions of both Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The statutes of both tribunal stipulate that the tribunals shall share, with national courts, concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute alleged perpetrators of core crimes, but the tribunals shall have primacy over the respective national courts. This concept is now widely known as the principle of primacy. Under this system both tribunals reserve the right to request from domestic courts cases deemed of having sufficient gravity to be tried by the tribunals. Drawing from this mode of interaction it suffices to conclude that the jurisdiction of the concerned domestic courts was in principle conditional on an absence of adjudication by the international