Corroborate The Air Of Ambiguity Of The Relations Between Britain And Japan

China appealed to Article 15 of the covenant, whereby the League had to create a commission of enquiry to gather facts and subsequently conciliate between belligerents. The committee was presided by the British Lord Lytton. The League had difficulties dealing with the Crisis due to a lack of facts, the remoteness of the crisis, and the historical relations between Britain and Japan. The remarks of the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir F. Lindley, corroborate the air of ambiguity surrounding the conflict “…whether the incident was a genuine attempt of ill-disciplined Chinese troops to interfere with the line, or whether it was engineered by Japan will never be known for certain”. Lindley’s sentiments correlate with the general discourse of uncertainty

Britain was experiencing the disastrous effects of the Great Depression, as such, intervening military in Japan could have been catastrophic for Britain. The horrors of 1914 remained at the forefront of political discourse, as well as public opinion; Britain wanted to avoid war at all cost. Moreover, Britain and Japan maintained cordial relationship prior to 1945. Historically, Britain and Japan hated tsarist Russia, signed bilateral treaties in 1902, and allied in 1914. Thus, for Britain, Japan was not an enemy, and even if it were, the economic situation would not enable her to venture into war in the Far East. Britain’s national interests halted her from taking decisive actions against Italy in 1923, as did national interests prevent her from defending the Covenant and China. Similarly, France and Germany were unable to sanction Japan effectively; the Depression crippled the German economy and starvation ensued, the French were economically weak and still trying to recover from the atrocities of 1914. Essentially, it was the worst time for league members, even if they were willing, to practice collective security and fight against