Dennett's Intentional Theory Analysis

In trying to understand the functioning and the nature of the mind, many theories have put across. In this essay I would like to focus on Dennett’s ‘Intentional Strategy’ as he gives a scientifically informed account of the mind. His approach is focused on the third person observer who ascribes intentions, beliefs and desires of an object or a thing thereby taking a stance. The stance taken helps one to ‘make sense of and predict the behaviour of any creature’ (Heil 1998:156). Then I will whether minds can be defined as a property of intentional system and finally, I will attempt to show that Dennett’s position is that of a reductionist. Intentionality can be defined as the directedness of one's mental states or acts or it can be said to be

To efficiently use the physical stance, one needs to have sustainable knowledge of the current being of the universe. Then one has to apply a broad understanding of physics to the present state of the universe in order to predict the future nature of the universe. In other words, the physical stance is a vigorous system of the physical sciences where the knowledge on the laws of nature is employed. The knowledge of physical constitution of the object in question is used to formulate prediction (Dennett 1981:557). Generally, things that are neither alive nor artifacts, the physical stance seems be the only available strategy even though there are important exception. Every physical thing designed or alive or not, is open to the laws of physics and behaves in ways that can be explained and predicted from the physical stance. Releasing an alarm clock or a goldfish from one’s hands has the same predictions about its downward

Certainly, Dennett’s intentional strategy highly makes a combative reductionist claim for he says that intentional agency in human beings is embedded in the pseudo-agency of the macromolecules in their bodies. This assertion has been challenged by Searle, who argues that it is exposed to the homunculus fallacy. Homunculus fallacy is an argument that explains a phenomenon in terms of that very phenomenon it has to explain. It is understood to be a fallacy because of its endless regression. The homunculus fallacy tries to account for the intentional ‘aboutness’ of our mental states by assuming some spectator in the brain who deems them to be about something (Robert 2011). Even though Dennett does not explain the intentional "aboutness" of one’s mental states in this manner, rather he does attempt to resolve the problem by applying the biological level attempt where the problem of ‘aboutness’ is said to disappear. His intentionality of our mental states is the working of the tiny agency of the large complex molecules in our bodies. The intelligent homunculus is substituted by a multitude of homunculi, each specialised in particular mini-task that it attempts to achieve. This approach seems to suspend the problem; it is not clear enough to what provide the macromolecular states with the intentional property of ‘aboutness’. This is the matter which Dennett does not account