Gettysburg Battle Analysis Essay

The Battle of Gettysburg and much of the Civil War itself provides a difficult battle analysis. Even the earliest of field manual containing the American Principles of War is from 1905, with the modern principles of war for the United States arriving in a post-WWII era. As such the offensive is a key point across the principles, something that could disadvantageous given the nature of battle in the Civil War. They still provide for a good analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg nonetheless, so long as you consider the nature of a more defensive war.

Following the Battle of Chancellorsville, Robert E. Lee decided on a second invasion of the North. On the 29th of June 1863, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Potomac at which point Lee ordered the concentration of Southern forces around Cashtown. Lee hoped to draw the Union Army into a decisive battle in open ground. The Union army’s strategic objective was to bring the Confederate army to battle while maintaining the defense of the capital in Washington, D.C. This fact was made known in the very first days of the Gettysburg campaign to Major General Joe Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac and later General Meade.

Clearly, throughout the three days of combat the Confederate forces were on the offensive, from their pushes against Herr, McPherson and Seminary Ridges on day one, their attacks against the Little Roundtop and Culp's Hill on day two and the ill-fated attack against the Union Center on day three, the South was on the offensive throughout the battle. The Army of the Potomac never attacked, defending all three days successfully. While they did fail to achieve this principle the nature of warfare during the Civil War put the defense at the advantage tactically. The true failure to achieve offensive only comes after the battle with General Meade failing to counterattack and pursue the Army of Northern