Following Germany’s successful invasion of France in June of 1940, Churchill was faced with the fateful decision of how Britain should address the German threat. Specifically, Churchill was presented with Hitler’s apparent proposal to “partition the world” with Britain; the deal would have been to let Britain keep its empire while Germany kept Europe. Rather than entertain the possibility of negotiating a peace deal, Churchill’s response was that no satisfactory peace could possibly be achieved until Britain had shown Hitler that it could not be conquered. “Even to inquire about German terms at this stage,” Churchill insisted, “would be a sign of weakness which would undermine Britain’s fighting position at home and abroad.” The decision to continue fighting and forgo negotiations was not in line with Britain’s best interests. Churchill’s decision was based upon three key incorrect assumptions: (1) Hitler’s pre-eminent goal was the subjugation of Britain rather than expansion to the east, (2) Germany’s economy could not handle a sustained war, and (3) signs of German destruction of the British homeland would quickly compel America to enter the war. Furthermore, Churchill’s negotiating strategy was hindered by approaching these assumptions categorically, rather than probabilistically. As Betts explains, such an approach causes people to become overconfident in their predictions …show more content…
I consider myself in a position to do this, since I am not a vanquished foe begging for favors but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war need go on.
In the summer of 1940, Hitler had taken concrete steps to present Churchill with a legitimate proposal. However, Hitler’s lack of credibility in the eyes of the West understandably made it difficult for Churchill to assess Hitler’s sincerity with respect to a peace deal. Analysis of Churchill’s