How Did Lloyd George Win The Treaty Of Versailles

Paris spring 1919, Europe had just lived through the desolation of the First World War, and the French civilians embraced the men who had helped them win victory. At the peace conference, that led to the establishment of the Treaty of Versailles, the most puissant of the triumphant nations, were represented by the big three: Georges Clemenceau the Prime Minister of France, Woodrow Wilson President of the United States of America, and Lloyd George the Prime Minister of Britain. Europe was “racked by hatred, fear, nationalism, and hunger,” (Nicolson 1945, pX) and it was their mission to recover its stability. Their task was to “reorganize a shattered world” (Ross 2003, p11), reallocate colonies, and inhibit a war like that from ever happening

Like France, Britain borrowed heavily, to finance its war; accordingly he wanted Germany to pay the debt. The mantra “squeeze the German lemon, ‘til the pip squeaks” was widespread, (Merriman 1996, p960) amongst the general public; at that time and it came as no surprise, that George won the general elections, in November 1918, by appealing to these feelings. Privately, nevertheless, he favoured a more sparing treatment of Germany, as It had been Britain’s second trading partner, and it was in Britain’s interest to not desolate Germany of its wealth; In order to reinstate the traditional balance of economic trade again. However, the President ordered the abatement of Germany’s navy size and the disrobing of German colonies from the nations control.

On the other hand, the United States President Woodrow Wilson did not want to punish Germany too harshly, in case it might pursue revenge. The idealistic man wanted to make a settlement based on his fourteen points, that encompassed his ambitions of achieving world peace through democratic ruler ship and self-determination, “the right of people of a particular nation (normally defined as people speaking the same language) to rule themselves. (Farmer 2000,

(Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 2006, p356). Rather the peace treaty laid down two principles on the subject of reparation: first (article 231) that Germany accepts responsibility for causing all the damage it inflicted upon the allies, and secondly (article 232) that the resources of Germany are not equal to repair the fatalities, nevertheless, she must compensate for the damage she caused to: injured persons, civilian victims, prisoners of war, property and finally any damages in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by Germany and her allies upon the civilian population. (the times 1920, p383) The normal procedure would have been for the allies to make an estimate of the amount of damage, and to present Germany with an ultimatum for the total. This total would have been reparation pure and simple, leaving Germany to decide how it would pay. This was not done, a reparation commission was set up to determine what should be paid and how. Furthermore, a subsequent congress with Germany was abandoned and it had no say in the final terms. Thus, grievances arose and Germany was believed to be “humiliated, in a manner that did little honour to the conquerors