How The Articles Of Confederation Hindered The Central Government

July 4th, 1776, the United States declared its independence from Great Britain through the Declaration of Independence. Before long, series of documents, alongside the declaration, were constructed to rectify the conflict that had long existed between authority and liberty. The documents strived to resolve the tension by establishing a strong, representative government. The government would possess enough power to make decisive changes while also protecting and preserving the liberty of the people. In order for the country to operate successfully, the federal government must be able to have authority to control the well-being of the nation. The Articles of Confederation hindered the central government’s ability to achieve that authority due

To combat this issue, and the others within the Articles, the Constitution was drafted to provide a layout for the country with a stronger government without invading the liberty of the people. The government under the Articles were subjected to the will majority in any conflict and Madison claimed that “there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual”. The liberties of the people and the authority of the government were drastically diminished when faced against a majority in a purely democratic country because of the full control that party gained to push their own agenda. James Madison’s argument on the Constitution’s ability to fight faction was, “Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will broken into so many parts… the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.” The government will still be able to possess authority over states and people, however, instead of just two contrasting parties where there has to be a majority, a republic forges multiple differentiating groups and ideas that makes factions less probable. That, in turn, preserves the liberty of the people from overbearing

Under representation of these “chosen body of citizens”, Madison asserted that, “the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.” The argument of the Constitution on representatives is, when the authority from the people is given to representatives, those representatives make decisions that will safe-guard and protect the liberty of the people. Contrary to what Madison had insisted the Constitution would do under representatives, anti-federalist views presume the liberties of the people are jeopardized when their authority is placed into the hands of people that share no common interests with you. Enclosed in Brutus III, the question is asked, “what security therefore can there be for the people, where their liberties and property are at the disposal of so few men?” To inhibit the absence of connection between representatives and the people, the Constitution, Madison claimed, “forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures”. The Constitution had been designed to overcome this conflict as a mean to preserve the liberties of the nation, while establishing a