we neglect our own perfection. While there are additional duties that make us better moral persons, it is difficult to analyze them under C1 or C2 because of the uniqueness of these duties which focus on improving our capacity to act dutifully. Given that there are no duties to self derivable from C1 alone in the Doctrines of Virtues, when we turn to a discussion of duties to others we face even more complications. All the duties of love (and likewise benevolence) are loosely derived from C1. While we might consider other’ ends, we may not give practical assistance to others, such as neighbor who is in bad circumstance. This does not appear to conflict with C1 since to love our neighbors is to regard their ends as our own. However, for Kant, …show more content…
Such benevolence actively comes from the reason and follows the principle of C1.However; it could also be easily argued that such beneficence is merely the extension of self-benefit. In response to this misunderstanding, Kant claims that: Instead, legislative reason, which in its idea of humanity in general comprises me along with the whole race, also includes me, insofar as it is universally legislative, in the duty of mutual benevolence according to the principle of equality with all other man; and it permits me to be benevolent to myself under the condition that I am also benevolent to everyone else. This is because only in this way is my maxim (of beneficence) qualified for the universal legislation on which every law of duty is founded. Hence, benevolence must be practicable. In the end, after we have considered moral matters and universalization, benevolence must act. So, referring to the former example, we undoubtedly act under in accord with our duties to help our …show more content…
Within this literature, there are a number of approaches drawn from the critiques of other approaches. The discourse, based on these critiques of other approaches, tends to form a relatively complicated narrative. Kant’s ethics imply much more than the ‘formal accomplishment’ that of formalist readings, at this aspect, Non-formalists are doing much more than formalist did, they are not blind to the formal element of Kant’s ethics, but insist on parity and plurality in methodology to make Kant’s ethics plausible. Given that formal and non-formalistic reading Kant’s philosophy differs in the role they assign to CI, the two non-formalistic defenses are offering great attempts to explain emptiness critique and present problems. Each argument is successful in some ways, but each one has its obscure part and leaves some questions