Are Business Professions Considered Morally Wrong

Here I discuss whether business professionals may perform actions otherwise considered morally wrong. This requires for their role to come with special moral permissions. I approach this problem by investigating how role morality relates to ordinary morality and whether conflicts between the two arise for special permissions to try to resolve. I shall argue to the contrary: that there is no distinction between role and ordinary morality by attacking the various proposed justifications for role moral permissions. I will then conclude that it will be wrong for the business professional to do on their client’s behalf what is wrong of the clients to do themselves.

This paper will be structured as follows: it will start off by defining roles and

However, it does not escape from generating unjust negative externalities to non-participants. Like political and legal institutions, businesses often have a larger impact on society. Consider again the example of people living in close proximity to a factory emiting hazardous toxins in the air. Again, they do not seek or receive benefits from the enterprise. Furthermore, the externality often extends to harming various aspects of the target’s life – pollution also decreases the desirability of the neighbourhood and the values of residents’ properties, so it is highly implausible that adversary practices can be self-contained, just and not affect non-participants. Then it becomes highly implausible for the justice condition to be satisfied and for the FPP to grant special moral

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