Thesis Statement Operation Anaconda was a military operation that took place in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan. It occurred during the beginning of the war against terrorism in March of 2002. The intent of this operation was to push enemy Taliban and al Qaeda out of the region with possibility of capturing some of the enemies’ top leaders. The battle was ultimately a success; however, this outcome came only after many significant issues within mission command. Despite careful planning and a strong military force, the failure of the command structure during this operation can be attributed to inadequate communication, a lack of flexibility, and a failure to account for the terrain and enemy capability. Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, …show more content…
The commander’s intent was achieved only due to the adaptability of all commands and combat teams present during the operation. Ground troops fully implemented the tasks necessary to achieve the intent, and then adapted to changes factors during battle in order to further the commander’s intent. MG Hagenbeck drew his intent from past experience within the battles previously fought against the Taliban. Typically, when the Taliban were up against pressure from U.S. Forces, they would battle only long enough to create opportunity for their higher leadership to escape. Afterwards, the Taliban ground teams would either surrender or escape themselves. The commander’s intent at Anaconda was assumed to be the same situation. To drive the Taliban from the area, capture, or destroy the enemy. The operation was only assumed to last a couple days; however, it ended up lasting a lot longer. At every aspect to further …show more content…
MG Hagenbeck and commanders of the air units involved had to measure the risk involved to friendly forces. This was due to the terrain and locations of friendly’s close to enemies. Air forces were unable to use GPS and laser targeting for precise locations of targets. This led to pilots needing to visually acquire targets based off communication with ground forces. Margin for error increased based off this, and additionally.
enemy forces were well dug into the terrain, leaving it almost impossible to visually acquire them. Over the course most of these issues were resolved by transferring authority to Task Force Mountain, MG Hagenbeck. With this change and risk acceptance, Task Force Mountain were better equipped to identify and verify targets, limiting threat on friendly