Operation Torch Impact

November 8, 1942 the day United States military forces with the help of the United Kingdom had launched an operation against French North Africa. The French were holding territories of Algeria and Morocco. The code name Torch it reflected the results of the long and contentious arguments that had gone on between British and American planners about the future course of Allied strategy. There was intervention by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the arguments that finally stilled the arguments between the allies. Torch’s impact was great and enormous through the course of the rest of the war. The most important strategic decision that the Allied leaders would ever make during the war. Operation Torch had postponed the landing in France until 1944, it

They turned to a problem that allowed a flood of Japanese conquests and victories that had raised in the Pacific. General George C. Marshall was the United States Army’s chief of staff. His views of the strategic problem put into a perspective of ample terms: He said that the United States should concentrate its military power on trying to make a successful lodgment on the European continent as soon as they could. During the summer of 1942 the Soviet Army seemed very desperate as Adolf Hitler’s panzer divisions were pushing on toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The American military believed that it would be necessary for them to invade northwestern Europe in 1942 so they could take the heat off of the Soviets.But they had a preferred date in mind it was the spring of 1943, the American ground forces would more ready for anything that would come their way, they trained and equipped to fight the Wehrmacht on the European continent. There were many difficulties that the operation had brought they had believed that American's intelligence and strategies and resources could solve the

Field Marshal Alan Brooke had taken a very different approach to everything. There was many optimistic views about a cross Channel operation in 1943. The british were completely against launching such an operation in 1942. Their had opposition in the United Kingdom because they would have to bear so much of their military operation. The British military leaders had experienced the vicious fighting against the Germans in World War I that had inflicted such heavy casualties on their forces. Most of them had also confronted the Wehrmacht’s formidable fighting power during the disastrous 1940 campaign in France while the experiences of British forces in North Africa and Libya against Field Marshal Erwin Rommel it did so much to diminish their respect for the German military capabilities. After the war, Brooke put the situation in these terms. He said, That he had found Marshall's rigid form of strategy very difficult to cope with. He said that he had never really fully appreciated what operations in France would mean the different type of training of German divisions as opposed to the rawt traiining American divisions and to most of our new divisions. He could not appreciate the Germans could reinforce the point of attack some three to four times faster than we could, nor would he understand that until the Mediterranean was open again we should always suffer from a crippling shortage of sea