Soviet Intelligence In The Cold War

When one thinks of espionage between the United States and the Soviet Union, the first time period that usually comes to mind is the Cold War. The Cold War is perhaps the point when Soviet Intelligence was at its peak performance in obtaining large quantities of intelligence at an exceptionally expedient pace against the United States. This superb performance, however, did not materialize overnight; it took vast networks of agents and procedures for recruiting and handling assets that required trial and error. The establishment of Soviet espionage in the U.S. required years of construction, dating back to the New Deal era. Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev’s The Haunted Wood offers unique insight into Soviet intelligence records during

Specifically looking at the New Deal era, it is clear that Soviet intelligence preferred to recruit assets using ideological enticements, resulting in large networks in short periods of time, but also contributing to the eventual loss of several key intelligence assets.

Laurence Duggan

One of the first Soviet intelligence assets during the New Deal years, Laurence Duggan, proved to be a useful asset at first by fostering a network of assets; however, his ideological motivation for supporting Soviet intelligence quickly led to his demise as he began to have doubts. Since Soviet intelligence had to build a network of assets from the ground up, building a network quickly and effectively was a major priority. Laurence Duggan worked in the Latin American Division at the State Department, and he naturally cultivated friendships in divisions like the European Division, an important priority for the Soviets. Meanwhile, his handler was cultivating relationships with other State

In 1936-39, also known as the “purge years,” millions of Soviets were killed, prompting Duggan to reevaluate his commitment to furthering USSR ideals. Weinstein and Vassiliev write, “…Soviet citizens in the 1936-39 purge years, when millions were imprisoned, tortured, and executed. Duggan raised the question of the purges with Norman Borodin (handler) on July 2, 1937, according to the latter’s memorandum to Moscow on the discussion, which suggested the State Department official’s troubled reaction to recent events in the Soviet Union” (12). Duggan was always a strong advocate for Soviet ideals, however these seemingly unjustified killings caused him to reassess his devotion to the USSR. This raises a problem with Soviet intelligence’s recruitment method. The handlers took a risk cultivating assets that were ideologically motivated; the second an asset starts to doubt the ideals of the nation he or she supports, it is likely that he or she will stop pledging support. In this case, Duggan continued to express his concerns and disapproval of the USSR, ultimately ending with his suicide. Although the ideological recruitment is a fast and effective way to obtain a loyal agent, it does not always ensure an asset’s long-term