Summary Of A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge

In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley differentiates between general and abstract ideas. He gives two arguments against the existence of abstract ideas, both of which are compelling. Berkeley continues to explain how people are misled by language into believing abstract ideas. Although his argument is sound, I will provide an alternative viewpoint on the role of language. For much of the introduction, Berkeley discusses the concept of general and abstract ideas. The author acknowledges the existence of general ideas, claiming that they represent specific “fictions… of the mind” (Berkeley, 14). He gives several examples of general ideas, such as names of people. He argues that the words Peter and John refer

Think of an abstract triangle

2. You cannot think of an abstract triangle

3. So abstract triangles do not exist He encourages the reader to think of an abstract triangle, and then he proceeds to describe several different triangles, whether they be acute, right, or scalene (14). Because it is possible to think of varying triangles, how could there be a single, abstract idea of a triangle? It is not possible to create a mental image of a triangle that exhibits the qualities of all possible triangles, and therefore Berkeley’s first argument against the existence of abstract ideas is sound. Berkeley makes a second argument using a contradiction that leads to the same conclusion. This argument is as follows:

1. Think of an abstract idea (i.e. triangle)

2. Every triangle is distinctly right, obtuse, or

He at first agrees on “a property… to some one particular triangle”, but consequently cannot form an idea of a singular abstract triangle (16). The second premise is true based off of geometric proofs. The third premise was already established in Berkeley’s first argument against abstract ideas. Since the premises are true, the second argument against the existence of abstract ideas is also sound. If we apply this argument to my dog, we find that we reach a similar conclusion. For example, as mentioned above, when I think of a general dog, I think of my dog. Although my dog is black in color, an abstract dog would be neither black nor any other color, seeing as an abstract dog would need to theoretically define every dog in existence. Therefore, because of a simple comparison between fur colors, my general idea of a dog is not the same as the idea of an abstract dog. It should be noted that Berkeley generalizes and applies this argument to all abstract ideas, saying that “it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of angles, or relations of the sides… So far he may abstract: but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea of a triangle” (16). Because I cannot possibly conceive of something that would align with its abstract idea, we may believe in Berkeley’s blanket statement, albeit with a hint