The Case Of Harris Vs Csx

In the case of Harris v. CSX a railroad worker by the name of Ronald K. Harris filed against his employer, CSX Transportation Inc., under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act. Mr. Harris suffered from cancer, specifically multiple myeloma, which he believed was caused by his exposure to diesel exhaust fumes in his line of work. Unfortunately, after filing and while the case was pending, Mr. Harris succumbed to his cancer and legal proceedings against CSX Transportation were taken over by Deborah Kay Harris, administratrix of his estate. The amended filing by his estate stated Mr. Harris died of cancer, specifically multiple myeloma, brought on by exposure to diesel exhaust fumes. The circuit court of Marshall

The Supreme Court found, after analysis of the case, that they did in fact commit an error. The main issue was the misinterpretation of the Daubert/Wilt standard by the trial court. The significance of the Daubert/Wilt standard is to provide a framework for determining the reliability of expert testimony. The court using the Daubert/Wilt standard checks to determine whether the expert used a methodology recognized by the scientific community for rendering their expert opinion and whether this methodology was correctly applied. If it was and the scientific expert is deemed qualified then the testimony is considered reliable and can be used at trial. This entails Rule 702 in which a qualified expert can testify in the form of an opinion. What the trial court did was allow an evidentiary hearing to take place over a few days at the request of the CSX Transportation defense. During this hearing they heard the testimony of all the expert witnesses. Their mistake occurred when they ruled the plaintiff’s three scientific experts, Dr. Goldstein, Dr. Infante, and Dr. Durie, as excluded from the trial case on the basis of unreliable testimony. They concluded that the three experts did not use reliable methodologies to prove conclusively that Mr. Harris’s cancer, multiple myeloma, was caused by

The dissenters from the Supreme Court’s actual decision say that the Supreme Court erred in not supporting the decision of the trial court. They argued that the trial court correctly and thoroughly evaluated the expert testimonies given under the Daubert/Wilt standard and it was not the appeals court’s place to perform that same evaluation. The trial court found reason when, as set down by Joiner v. General Electric, they saw there was too great a gap between the data used and the opinion offered by the plaintiff’s expert witnesses. This, along with a lack of valid scientific evidence relevant to proving causation between diesel exhaust and multiple myeloma, gave them cause to exclude the plaintiff’s expert testimony. The appeals court, in attempting that same evaluation outside their role, infringing on the role of the trial court, incorrectly focused on the qualifications of the experts and their opinions and not their actual evidence provided, which the trial court did focus on. This argument, in my opinion, would have led to a bad decision by the Supreme Court. The problem with it I have is that it seems to put aside weight of the evidence methodology. Alone, certain citations of evidence by the expert witnesses would not have established causality between diesel exhaust and multiple myeloma. It was the combination of evidence that established the causality. The