The New Chicken Or Egg Summary

The New Chicken or Egg: Discovery of AI or mind

The question of whether digital computers are capable of thinking is fundamentally important given the rise of AI (Artificial Intelligence). For decades now, the dialogue has been going back and forth without any definitive answers on how we should form our attitudes on this question. This is greatly due to the fact that science gives little answers to how the mind is structured and how it functions. Strong AI is intended to be not merely a tool used in discovery of the mind, but a simulation of the actual mind for direct study that sheds light on the questions unanswered through other means of science. However, creating strong AI may be impossible without thorough knowledge of the mind. In the

Searle uses this thought experiment to demonstrate that the Turing Test and any other similar measure that solely relies on the computer’s ability to give human-like outputs is insufficient in determining whether computers can think. Searle, however goes on further to claim that without the biochemical makeup of a brain and nervous system, it is inconceivable for a machine to be able to think (422). The Chinese Room is not merely used to show that the Turing test is insufficient in determining the ability of computers to think, but also to show that no matter how sophisticated (e.g. systems reply, robot reply, combination reply) a computer is, it will not have actual understanding or

objects to Searle’s claims. Most notably, the paper suggests that a thought experiment should only be deemed useful when knowledge on the ideas being discussed is sufficient enough for the imagination to pick up on inconsistencies. Then, the paper shifts to discussion on how the Chinese room is clearly appealing to our knowledge or common sense on something we are rather unknowledgeable in, arguing by analogy of the luminous room (35). Furthermore, directly addressing the problem with why the Chinese room is not sufficient to persuade one on the argument, they argue: “he is in no position to insist, on the strength of this appearance, that rule-governed symbol manipu­lation can never constitute seman­tic phenomena…Rather than exploit one's understanding of these things, Searle's argument freely exploits one's ignorance of them” (35), Further discussing that we are not in a place to judge a machine’s ability through thought experiments like the Chinese Room or the Turing Test, the Churchlands make the case that in order to be able to answer the question of whether machines are capable of thinking, we must first know more about how a mind