The Pros And Cons Of The Electoral System

Economic outcomes may be structured by constitutional choices – and the resulting political institutions.
The linkage between electoral rules and party structure along with the type of government (single party government or coalition) has been actively studied by political scientists.
In the research on electoral systems, the question of how different electoral rules result in different party systems has been a special area of interest. (Duverger; 1954, Grofman and Lijphart; 1986, Lijphart; 1994, Norris;2004 , Shugart;2005).
Perhaps the most prominent result among the previously mentioned studies was Duverger’s Law which stated that majority rule in single member districts yields a two-party system (Duverger; 1954). This law, and many other findings, resembled important

Politicians will then have to exert more effort in producing better macroeconomic outcomes.
In the same trend, Persson and Tabellini (2000) regard the importance of accountability as a restriction for politicians from abusing their powers, adding that voters’ punishment (or reward) generates an incentive for good behavior for politicians. They further add that politicians will have greater incentives to please the voters if they were held accountable individually rather than collectively.
The ballot structure then is highly correlated with accountability. Politicians if held accountable collectively will show less incentive to please the voters than if they were held accountable individually. Accordingly, party lists discourage effort by office-holders and will then cause political rents to be higher. (Persson and Tabellini;2000Persson and Tabellini;2003)
Individual accountability then, along with plurality rule, results in better incentives for politicians to please the voters and leads to less corruption (Persson and Tabellini,