The Real Intelligence Failure Case Study

Does the ODNI Effort in Regards to Analytic Rigor and Standards Provide an Effective Framework to Improve the Quality of Analytical Products and Conclusions?

Since the Office of Director of National Intelligence was formed in 2005, it has endured many changes within its own organization as well as the Intelligence Community. Changing directors often, at one point in time, made it hard to build continuity throughout the Intelligence Community. Once Director Clapper came on board as the Director of ODNI things started to shape up and maybe in a way that they had not shaped up before. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) really specified what government officials felt the IC needed which was improved intelligence

Both of these events were seen as intelligence failures. According to Mark Lowenthal’s “The Real Intelligence Failure? Spineless Spies,” he states that 9/11 failed because intelligence failed to connect the dots and the Iraq WMD failed because intelligence connected too many dots; intelligence did not warn intensely enough in 9/11, but that intelligence was accused of warning too intensely on Iraq; 9/11, intelligence failed to use imagination, but used too vivid an imagination for Iraq lastly, most talked about IC failure, not enough information was shared leading up to 9/11 but too much information was shared for Iraq so to the point that Iraq was successful in using a defector named curveball. What I gathered from this author’s opinion is that it appeared that the IC just couldn’t get it right in the eyes of policy makers. In my opinion, between these two events, the IC had become gun shy from the “YOU FAIL” finger pointing of 9/11 and did not want to receive the same chastisement as before and therefore ensured that they left no stone unturned when it came to Iraq WMD. Unfortunately, this aggressive type of

It is easy to make recommendations and demands when you are on the outside looking in, especially if you are the person people must answer to, but when you are the one that is doing the work all day every day, the recommendations or demands may appear asinine. Part of DNI’s responsibility is to ensure compliance with IRPTA specified analytic quality standards. However, some staffers have noted that the IC has made some changes, but without attribution to the IRTPA. This could be because some staffers believe that IRTPA reflects political needs, making it a seriously flawed reform blueprint for the ODNI