Burwell V. Hobby Lobby Analysis

In Chapter 16 of Thomas Hobbes’ book, Leviathan, he discusses natural and artificial persons as well as authors and actors in relation to social contract theory. Although the terms appear to be similar, ultimately, they have key characteristics that set them apart, therefore, in this paper I will explore the definitions and then outline any possible distinctions deciding if and how the terms may apply the Supreme Court Case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. To start, I will define persons, then I will differentiate between natural and artificial persons. Hobbes’ defines person as someone who represents himself or another man and whose words and actions are heeded. A person is considered a natural person when his words and actions are his own and an artificial

A natural person is defined as someone whose words and actions are his own while an author is “he that owneth his words and actions,” this may appear synonymous at first, however, natural person is arguably synonymous with actor as well. To reiterate, Hobbes’ claims that “to personate, is to act, or represent himself,” which means, to be a person is to act or to represent oneself. This begs the question, does a natural person not represent himself? No rational person would argue for this. With this in mind, one cannot group natural person and author together while aligning artificial person and actor, because, as I have just concluded, an author is also an actor, if he chooses to represent himself. To be clear, a natural person is both an author and an actor; his words are his own, making him an author, and he represents himself, thus making him an actor. In conclusion, the distinction between natural and artificial persons is not the same as the distinction between authors and actors because a natural person is both an author and an actor while an artificial person is simply an actor—and occasionally, a