The Vietnam War: The Kennedy And Johnson Administrations

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations allowed news and media outlets unrestricted access to the war. Not only did this cause distrust within the American public, the Administration now had a scapegoat to blame for their problems. The American public grew wary of the war and began to distrust the men in charge and in return the Administration would blame this on the medias poor portrayal of the war. The Administrations actually believed that this war could be fought from their desks in Washington D.C. Although the United States government ignored the history of the people in Indochina, the American people were more enlightened. The American public slowly began to understand that they would never win the war in Vietnam; the only way to win

Kennedy’s need to prove himself through the use of an elite Administration. McGeorge Bundy failed as the National Security Advisor for both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In simplest terms, he was one of “the best and the brightest,” but his overconfidence drove his determination for a military commitment in Vietnam. His error of overconfidence stemmed from the fact that “Mac Bundy and the others had all been partner to so precious little failure in their lives that there was always a sense that no matter what, it could be avoided, deflected.” Once President Kennedy was assassinated, Bundy pressured President Johnson to build up the American military presences in Vietnam, all the while Bundy never provided any definitive strategies. At the same time, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara managed hundreds of military missions and spent billion in military spending. McNamara, like the rest of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, was overly confident and always certain that his

In a sense, he bulldozed President Johnson into doing irrational bombings in Vietnam. McNamara convinced Johnson that bombings should be the only direct response to escalation. Although McNamara sometimes had doubts, he was usually supportive of whatever bombing strategies were proposed. McNamara skillfully withheld the realities of Vietnam from Johnson and the public, so he could continue fighting the war his way. He wanted to send thousands of more troops and spend millions arms. Johnson allowed for McNamara to take certain actions and, therefore, he announced that he would increase the number of men in Vietnam from 75,000 to 125,000. McNamara was able to get away with more damage during the Johnson administration that he was under Kennedy. McNamara was a smart man but something was missing; “he was, finally, the embodiment of the liberal contradictions of that era, the conflict between the good intentions and the desire to hold and use power.” McNamara also made sure to surround “himself with men who met his criteria, men who responded to the same challenges and belief.” McNamara’s greatest fault was that he had many doubts about the bombings however, he continued with his mission. Anytime a problem arose, McNamara believed throwing troops at it was the best solution. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States also failed to understand the vastness of the war. The CIA underestimated