When The Us Invade Russia Summary

When the United States Invaded Russia by Carl J. Richard provides a fascinating look at a little-known historical incident – the US intervention in Siberia from 1918-1920. Richard gives background information about the intervention, details the causes that led President Woodrow Wilson to decide to send troops to Siberia, explains why Wilson continued the intervention after the original motives for it no longer applied, describes how the soldiers fared in Siberia and shows that the mission was ultimately a failure. All-in-all, it is a well-researched and thorough discussion of a topic not usually covered in history books or classes.

Richard begins the book by describing the horrors of World War I. He views this as important background to the

Why? Richard says there were three main reasons. Firstly, Wilson was starting to realize the threat the Bolsheviks presented, as they were now rising in power and murdering and terrorizing their opponents. He therefore kept his soldiers there to fight Bolshevism. This focus of Wilson’s is clear from the massive amount of aid he gave to White armies. In addition, the president wanted to prevent a total Japanese takeover of Siberia, a threat that seemed imminent given the amount of troops they were sending in (72,000 as opposed to the promised 12,000) and their invasion of Manchuria. The Japanese were also supporting the two main Kolchak-regime generals in Siberia, Gregori Semenov and Ivan Kalmikov who did everything they could to upset the Americans and get them to leave (like stealing their supplies, arresting their men, and even murder). Thus, Wilson was rightfully wary of leaving Japan alone in Siberia. Richard explains that the third reason the soldiers remained in Siberia was that Wilson wanted to wait until after the Paris Peace Conference to change his Russian policy so he could ask the other Allies their

While some (noticeably British Prime Minister Lloyd George) wanted to invite all the Russian factions, including the Bolsheviks, to the Paris Peace Conference and not interfere in Russian affairs regarding who should rule there, others (such as French Prime Minister Clemenceau) were adamantly opposed to such an idea and wanted to get rid of the Soviet government by making a “cordon sanitaire” – ring of anti-Bolshevik states around Russia to crush it economically. According to Richard, Wilson agreed with George, but still wanted to placate Clemenceau, so he suggested holding the peace conference somewhere else so that the Bolsheviks would not threaten France. This did not work though because the Whites in Russia weren’t interested. According to Richards, other plans suggested included sending even more soldiers to Russia (obviously impractical in battle-weary, post-World War 1 Europe), giving the Bolsheviks humanitarian aid if they stopped military action (which the Bolsheviks refused – because acceptance would have meant destruction by the White Army) and to continue to support Kolchak’s government (impractical, since this government was so weak). For obvious reasons, none of these plans succeeded. In this chapter, Richard also talks briefly about the “Red Scare” in America at the time, when any suspected Communist was arrested and held under terrible conditions (like putting 23 people in a