Why Did Italy Obtain Both The Alliance And The Entente

These terms were perhaps the best Italy could have hoped for, after many months of negotiations with both the Alliance and the Entente. Their discussions with the Alliance were doomed before they even started, with Germany and Austria reluctant to negotiate with their untrustworthy and unforthcoming “ally”, and Italy already convinced they would gain more from the Entente. In the end, the Foreign Minister managed to secure a lucrative deal as far as Italy’s territorial ambitions were concerned. The Treaty of London was signed on 29th April 1915, and promised Italy a great deal in return for her military aid:

“ARTICLE 4. Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with its geographical and natural frontier,

The Treaty of London is a physical manifestation of one part of this image, of the myth of the Great Power, as it is a “completion” of the territorial and colonial ambitions Italy hoped would secure its status as Great Power. And whilst it ties into the grander picture of why Italy decided to join the war, it is also a more simplistic reason. The Italian government decided to enter the First World War in May 1915 because of the Treaty of London; their negotiations had come to a satisfying end and they felt there was nothing more to be gained from prolonging neutrality. I firmly believe that had Germany and Austria offered up more attractive deals earlier, or London and the Entente had been more reluctant to negotiate with Italy’s demands, Italy would have entered the war much later than it already did. Certainly, even looking at the terms of the Treaty of London, there was more that could have been done, more benefits and strength that could have been gained from further negotiation, but, as we shall see, this was more than enough for the personal ambitions of Italy’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to propel Italy into the war in May

The Intervention crisis was both the death of a politic career and the making of one. Giovanni Giolitti, the Liberal leader who had dominated Italian politics for well over a decade and had been Prime Minister four times before the outbreak of the First World War, bowed out of office in March of 1914 and dedicated himself to the cause of neutrality at the start of the war. His replacement, Antonio Salandra, an ambitious and conservative man, and prior Minister of Finance and of the Treasury, was far more open to exploring the benefits Italy might receive for her part in the war. Along with his close colleague, Sidney Sinnino, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs after the untimely death of San Giuliano, Salandra managed to use the war as a force to propel himself and the conservative sect of parliament into a far more profitable position, and ultimately drove Giolitti from politics all together. Despite their own blunders (Sinnino’s laughable negotiation skills, and Salandra’s sacro egoism comments) they succeeded in isolating Giolitti when a letter was published in La Tribuna on 2nd April, which twisted his words to present him as an absolute neutralist, even at the cost of potential great gains