Wickard Vs Wilburn Case Analysis

Five years later, Wickard v. Filburn came before the Supreme Court, making a case similar to Jones & Laughlin, however this case was different in that the arguments were more reasonable, given the circumstances surrounding the case. Tackling the direct v. indirect issue, the court makes a logically sound argument in their definition of a Commerce Clause issue. The Court gives Congress power if the act “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’” Justice Jackson writes that although the excess wheat is for personal use, there would be a substantial effect on interstate commerce if every farmer was allowed

In an attempt to steer the Court back in the right direction after the judicial misstep in Jones & Laughlin, the Court makes the clear distinction that the criminal statute (Gun-Free School Zones Act) in question “has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” Bringing up the central issue with the Jones & Laughlin case, Rehnquist further explains, “the Government admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.” In the Jones & Laughlin case, the central problem was the ability to connect anything with interstate commerce, no matter how indirect. The court, in this case, is limiting the scope of that interpretation by clearly demonstrating how criminal matters cannot line up with interstate commerce unless one piles inference upon inference. The Court further explains this issue by saying, “we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner what would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.” The opinion goes on to read: “Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to

This case is lacking the crucial ‘commercial’ aspect that the precedent has. Even though the court states, “the cultivation of wheat for home consumption—was not treated by the Court as part of his commercial farming operation,” it was certainly a fact that was assumed and implied in the decision process. For example, lets say the federal government limited the manufacture, possession, and use of toys through the Commerce Clause. A toy company who manufactures and sells toys is restricted to a certain number of toys, however this company decides to make extra toys for their employees’ kids, above and beyond the limited amount. This scenario cannot be remotely connected to a stay-at-home mom in the State of California who makes toys for her family and friends and is forced to give them up by federal law. The toy company is heavily invested in interstate commerce; however, the stay-at-home mom does not impact interstate commerce without making inference upon inference. When the court says that the status of Wickard in the commercial market did not matter in the decision, they neglected to point out that it must have been an underlying assumption that was incorporated into their decision. Wickard’s job was to be a farmer and any excess materials is still