William James The Varieties Of Religious Experience

William James was a late 19th and early 20th century American philosopher. In this paper, I will be examining a portion of one of his works The Varieties of Religious Experience. Specifically, section 11.2 Mysticism which delves into the topic of mystical experiences. First James lays out some definitions that are key to understanding his arguments. He then argues three warrants for why a person should believe in mystical experiences. It is these three warrants and their arguments that I will be summarizing in this paper. I will also be providing my objections to his arguments as I address each of them in turn.

Before delving into the primary argument James’ defines what mystical experience means in his paper. He does this by defining mystical

He lists them as “…less sharply marked, but are usually found” (James, 99). Transiency is one of these criteria that is frequent but not required. It refers to the observation that mystical states do not usually have a lengthy duration. According to James, these experiences commonly last at most one or two hours. Afterward, they can only be partially remembered unless something linked to the topic of the experience causes the memory to resurface. James lists passivity as the final criteria to a mystical experience. This is described as being gripped or guided by a higher power. Symptoms of this include prophesies, speaking in tongues, alternate personalities, and writing or drawing during the experience. While not all mystical experiences include these, I do agree with James’ observation that they are common enough to warrant listing among his “marks” of mystical

While I do not completely denounce his point of an experience having authority over the mystic, I will argue against the claim of its absolute authority. A mystical experience that is as enlightening as is required to fulfill James’ criteria would undoubtedly change a person’s perspective in any number of ways. So, it is entirely reasonable to believe such a person’s perspective would be highly resistant to alteration from external challenges. However, this does not render these beliefs invulnerable to debate. I see no reason to interfere with the religious practices of a mystic enlightened by an experience, but this does not mean I cannot question why the mystic follows the beliefs they formed from a mystical experience. If the mystics new creed is deserving of such authority, then it is in the interest of all to ascertain why, as it clearly means the mystic knows something everyone else doesn’t. But as I mentioned earlier ineffability becomes a problem here. I think beliefs should have sufficient justification and if a belief is justified it should be explainable to someone else. It is here that ineffability forms a barrier between rational thought and the authority a mystical experience has over the mystic. James’ claims that rational thought cannot question, critique, or explain mystical experience. I believe this is immensely convenient for mysticism. This warrant, and as I will discuss later the entire