A Rhetorical Analysis Of The Cuban Missile Crisis

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History has a tendency to repeat itself. A prime example is the German’s invasion of Russia in World War II, which draws parallels to the Napoleonic conquest of 1812. Today this trend continues in Afghanistan. The current American situation appears to have come to a similar crossroad that plagued the Russian and British conquests that preceded it; and unfortunately, will reach the same result. The Cuban Missile Crisis was landmark event in human history, brought upon by geopolitical tension between the two global Super Powers in 1962. The current political rhetoric leaves me to speculate the likely hood of a similar situation arising is possible.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the result of tensions that manifested after the Potsdam Agreement. …show more content…

Khrushchev demanded that France, Great Britain, and the United States give West Berlin to East Germany with in six-months (Belfer Center). After repeating letting the deadline slip, Khrushchev needed to reestablish leadership within his party and show NATO the Soviets’ resolve (Belfer Center).
After the revolution, Castro started buying mass quantities of small arms from any country willing to sell. The doubling of the revolutionary army was done amidst fears of an uprising that would remove Castro from power (Belfer Center). At first, Cuba was not interested in the global super power competition. Castro was even dismissed by the Russians, but as Cuba made reforms that striped land from American interests; the Russians took notice. As the political distance between Cuba and the United States grew, the Soviets seized the opportunity to establish a communist presence in the Caribbean (Belfer …show more content…

These forces were arrayed against a vastly more powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal of 203 ICBMs, 1,306 long-range bombers with 3,104 nuclear warheads, and 144 SLBMs—all told, about nine times as many nuclear weapons as the U.S.S.R. Nikita Khrushchev was acutely aware of America’s huge advantage not just in the number of weapons but in their quality and deployment as well” (Schwarz, 2014).
Photo from: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International affairs
I chose a map that was likely presented to President Kennedy at an Ex Comm. meeting in October, 1962. The projection depicts different ranges of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. Although not to scale, the 2200 nautical mile (NM), and the 1020 NM ranges show the expected range of a medium range ballistic missiles SS-4, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles SS-5 missile in 1962 (CIA). The 630 NM range indicates the largest round trip distance an IL-28 bomber could fly (Belfer Center). These weapons were dismantled and shipped to Cuba in one of the most well executed deception plans yet to date