Air Power In The Book On War By Clausewitz

Contrary to analyst predictions, the United States and the Soviet Union did not start World War III. Since the end of World War II, the great powers, and developed states in general, have seldom fought each other. Regretfully, civil wars, unconventional wars and ethnical cleansings have increased in numbers from 1960s through the 1990s.” Consequently, the world has witnessed more conflicts but with less bloody battles, at least in casualty figures. This paradox raises the question about the change in nature and character of wars.
In the masterpiece book On War, Clausewitz argued that the fundamental nature of war resembles a “paradoxical trinity” whose constituting elements are “violence, chance, and rational purpose.” Opposite to nature

In the late 1980s, John Warden designed an air strategic campaign based on five concentric rings: “leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population and fielded military.” In this model, airpower could perform a parallel attack trough the rings, provoking an “insuperable damage.” At the same time, Robert. A Pape suggested an analysis of air power as a coercive instrument, based on the conceptual categories of punishment, risk and denial. In his book bombing to win he stated that “airpower is the most important instrument of modern military coercion”. Both of them, perfectly described the consequences of the second offset; significant increase of accuracy; airpower suitable to reach strategic objectives; and airpower as a tool for coercion. Briefly, a precise tool for bombing supposed a great change from the character of war, enhancing the airpower to a strategic level with incredible

Although some experts and theorists have claimed that cyber is a new type of war, it is simply a “sophisticated version of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.” As Thomas Rid argues “there is no known cyber-attack that unequivocally meets Clausewitz’s war’s fundamental nature: violence.” Nevertheless, a cyber-attack, combined with a military operation is a remarkable tool that facilitates the victory to the attacker. In august 2008, the Russian army attacked Georgian Forces in the first coordinated military operation with a cyber-attack, resulting in a quick success. In short, cyber warfare itself is not an “act of force,” is a new instrument that in combination with other instruments enhances the military power of an