Moreover, Hamas, ISIS and Al Qaeda differ significantly in the strategies and tactics they utilise to achieve their objectives. Firstly, Al Qaeda has a preference forprefers large-scale and dramatic attacks which are symbolic in their ideologies and penultimate objectives, the most notable of these being the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre (Byman 2015). This aligns well with Piazza’s argument (2009: 66) that universalist group attacks, such as those of Al Qaeda, generally generate higher casualty rates than attacks by strategic groups. Al Qaeda affiliates were responsible for 95.9% of the casualties that are attributed to Islamic Terrorism and generate four times the number of casualties per attack than non-Al-Qaeda groups (Piazza, 2009:74). …show more content…
On the other hand, ISIS is an organisation less concerned with symbolism, instead motivated by the desire to conquer, using artillery, forces and mass brutality to achieve their objectives (Byman 2015). Indeed, ISIS has a significantly more brutal approach, favouring public beheadings, rape and symbolic crucifixion in efforts to instil fear and terror within populations, as well as to purify the communities (Byman 2015). Both ISIS and Hamas’ attacks generally produce less casualty rates and are conducted with intent to inspire more immediate results (Piazza, 2009: 65). This ensures they maintain positive perceptions by their constituent populations in order to ensure perpetuating support for their ideologies and objectives (Piazza, 2009: 65). Attacks that result in high fatalities can have a series of undesirable repercussions: decrease constituent support, prompt criticism and opposition and complication negotiations (Piazza, 2009: 65). This is disparate to Al Qaeda, whom do not care for the constituent backlash and opposition to their actions (Piazza, 2009: …show more content…
Al Qaeda, as a universalist group, operates globally, propagating their ideologies at a transnational level and implementing attacks internationally, in adherence to their goal structure (Piazza, 2009: 65). Moreover, they are more concerned with the “far enemy”, that is the Western actors (Gerges 2005). Indeed, Bin Laden called for Al Qaeda and its affiliates to wage their wag against the “far enemy” of the US, and predominately perpetrate attacks on American, Israeli and European soil (Bertrand 2015). Al Qaeda, as it common to universalist radical groups, have a more distance relationship with their constituent populations, of whom can be located in all parts of the world (Piazza, 2009: 65). Indeed, they maintain morale and solidarity through their strong ideological beliefs and the symbolism that pertains to their actions. However, Hamas and ISIS, as strategic organisations operate primarily in a certain territory and have relatively small and powerful constituents of whom they act on behalf of and receive support in various ways (Piazza, 2009: 65). Moreover, their war is waged more against the “near enemy”, that is the governments of the territories in which the jihadi operate (Gerges 2005). Examples of this include Basha Assad’s Syrian government and Haider al-Abadi’s in Iraq, of whom blockade against the creation of an