Descartes Vs Aquinas Research Paper

Thus we can see that the cartesian division of the body and soul is avoided by insisting on the intimate union of soul and body to form one substantial being under the conception of form and matter. While Aquinas would agree that the soul and body are two different things, he would say that the body and soul depend on each other and act upon each other, with the soul being the first principle of life. Eleonore Stump explains the paradox of this truth: “The human soul . . . is a configured configurer. On the one hand, like an angel, it is able to exist and function on its own, apart from matter. On the other hand, the human soul is not, as Plato thought, a spiritual substance moving the body which is also a substance in its own right; rather,

Descartes as a dualist recognizes the soul and body's difference, but does not share Aquinas' understanding of how they come together. Aquinas sees that the two form one, with the soul being the principal of life for the two. And he distinguished the two without difficulty as demonstrated above in in 75.2, when he stated that the human soul is a subsistent because it has an activity that pertains to it without the use of a corporeal organ, namely, the activity of understanding in intellect (O'Callaghan, St. Thomas Aquinas). But Descartes does not have the benefit of these philosophical terms and understanding because he does away with all tradition before him. He creates his problematic thinking when he broke from the traditional understanding of substantial forms and the causes. Descartes no longer has a way to explain the soul and body's relationship, so instead he explains it by separating the two similarly to Plato before. Descartes would agree here but would not have the same philosophical approach in terms. In 75.4, Thomas proves that the soul is not the man, but for Descartes he is a “thinking thing”, as said before. His essence is derived from his thinking. While Aquinas recognizes the soul as the principal of life for the human person, he still recognizes that for man to be whole he still has the bodily activities of a living animal, i.e. sensation, nutrition, reproduction, and so on. These activities may not be of the soul alone, but together they are of the whole person. In 75.6, relying upon all that has gone before, Thomas argues that the human soul is a subsistent that is incorporeal, and thus does not cease to exist as a result of the death of the body. This result shows the soul to be a