With this quote, Madison describes the Founders’ intent to design a government which could self-balance and obstruct the majority’s monetary impulses. Specifically, the Founders believed that factions, groups of people united by common interests and passions, would quickly assemble and attempt to impose their will on the nation out of self-interest. Consequently, the Founders fashioned the Constitution with in-built roadblocks, separation of powers along with checks and balances, to pit factions against one another to slow down the government’s legislative abilities. For instance, the Founders created two houses within Congress to cause factions from multiple constituencies to check one another. As stipulated by the Constitution, small districts …show more content…
As with Madison, Senator Morris believed that the public could not be trusted in making law for the country’s whole well-being even if the government’s legitimacy flowed from the people. Hence, the Founders established the Senate to represent state governments’ interests and temper the legislative process. They achieved the former goal by establishing equal state representation, six year terms, and senators’ selection by state legislatures. Demonstrating the Senate’s responsibility to temper the legislative process, the Constitution grants it several exclusive powers, including jurisdiction over approving treaties. If this power was also granted to the House, the Founders feared that majorities would quickly overturn treaties with the quick ebb and flow of popular opinion. By distancing the Senate from the people, the Founders hoped the Senate would ensure the United States’s diplomatic consistency. Likewise, the Founders staggered senators’ selection, so the states only appointed one-third every two years. In theory, this selection timeline would offer continuity in legislative governance, while frequent elections would elect a new House every two years. Ultimately, the Senate’s existence ensures that lawmaking necessitates a near national consensus rather than a momentary majority because of its unrepresentative nature according to Dennis Hale and Marc Landy. Because smaller …show more content…
Specifically, Levitsky and Ziblatt refer to democracy's guardrails as its norms, namely mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance. The former relates to the recognition that your political opponents have a right to rule as long as they follow constitutional rules. Institutional forbearance refers to restraint in using legal measures to block political rivals' right to govern. When political groups slowly violate these norms by deploying legal measures, Levitsky and Ziblatt propose that political actors become more willing to reject democratic institutions altogether. In the U.S., both mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance seem deeply at risk. Contemporary politicians are more likely than their predecessors to use legal checks against their opponents. During the Obama Administration, Senate Republicans refused to consider President Obama’s final Supreme Court nominee and used the filibuster to kill Democratic legislation in unprecedented fashion according to How Democracies Die. Further, the far-right has increasingly held non-violent armed demonstrations. According to the Journal of Democracy, these demonstrations often intimidate political opponents away from voting. Although these demonstrations are legal, they illustrate how citizens are increasingly willing to use legal means to circumscribe their