Essay On April Accord

The tension between provincial and federal government is a continual struggle for power in Canadian politics. On April 16th, 1981, the highly debated April Accord was signed by the Gang of 8 and proposed to Trudeau as an amending formula for the Constitution. On the surface, it appeared to demonstrate a united front within the provinces in the Gang of 8. However, there is much controversy over whether the accord was an authentic solution to the amending formula or a way to stall negotiations since Trudeau would not approve it. Thus, the April Accord represents the political tension between the Gang of 8 and Prime Minister Trudeau. The accord encompasses the larger debate over centralization and decentralization in the Canadian government.

In terms of the involvement of the federal government, there is little mention other than compensation, so another objective is to minimize government intervention and have an autonomous province. Prior to this there had been no decided formula but presumably Ottawa’s would be sure to keep the power in the federal government, placing more power in the House of Commons and the Senate. The highlights of this accord involve an opt-out with financial compensation, approval of all provinces involved in any resolution that it applies to. In The Last Act, Ron Graham points to a significant outcome of the accord which would come back to haunt Levesque in later negotiations. Signing the accord meant that all the provinces are equal, none would get “special status” (Graham 222). Furthermore, he explains Levesque acknowledges “the constitutional the quality of provinces as equal partners in confederation” (109). This means that all provinces are entitled to the same rights as the others. Although, Levesque’s signature is arguably to keep the support of the Gang of 8 so he would not have to face Trudeau on his own rather than a sincere acceptance of this aforementioned

At the final stages of negotiation, Trudeau gives the provinces the opt-out with financial compensation. Moreover, this is entrenched in the amendment formula where the opt-out involves changes with “education or culture” (Graham 223). This is a significant compromise for Trudeau because it reduces the federal control over spending and would make the process of approval more complicated. The language in the April Accord is somewhat vague in this regard, asking for “reasonable compensation” (Government 303). This begs the question what is “reasonable”? Who has the discretion to decide the amount? Graham lists the compromises that create the Kitchen Accord, which includes the Gang of 8’s opt-out but it was not until later negotiations that Trudeau approves of this “financial compensation” in order to get the deal done (223). A highly debated aspect of the Accord is language rights which are granted with a compromise on Trudeau’s part in the final amendment formula. The debate involves whether language rights should be entrenched in the Charter or provinces must opt-in where it applies. In the accord, in section A, Article 4 states the “use of the English or the French language…authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and the Legislative Assembly of every province to which the amendment applies” (Government 303). This is significant for both