Inductivism Vs Falsification Theory

In inductivism, a finite number of specific facts leads to a general conclusion. In falsificationism, definite claims about the world make a law or a theory falsifiable. The more falsifiable a theory is, the better, but not yet being falsified. For falsificationism scientific progress is possible via trial and error. While inductivism is applied to mathematics for instance where generalization is more possible, falsificationism is really common in biology, physics or social sciences, where there is not a general pattern, but many exceptions to the laws or theories. In falsificationism, people are ready to abandon their claims when they are proved wrong. But, in inductivism the theory has to be non-falsifiable, and they can manage it, because

More specifically, a posterior theory (probability) derives from a prior theory (probability) in the light of new evidence. There is the objective and the subjective Bayesianism. The objective Bayesianism is not widely accepted, since all of the prior probabilities are objective, so they have the same odds. On the contrary, in subjective Bayesianism, the prior probabilities are known, so automatically some of them have different odds compare to others. When falsificationism rejects the ad hoc hypotheses, since the evidence and the hypothesis cannot be tested separately, the Bayesianisms accept them.

According to the new experimentalism, experiments are theory independent. In Chalmers book are given some examples of scientists, like Faraday and Hertz, who did experiments and observations without having a background theory behind them.

To my mind these two modern approaches cannot be considered as accounts of science. Bayes’ theorem was created to be applied in gambling and not in science. New experimentalism considers that experiments do not depend on theories. I agree that there are examples like those of Faraday and Hertz, but behind an experiment or observation there is always theory, even though people do not consider it. For instance, their equipment, that both Faraday and Hertz used, was created according to some theories. Nowadays, the experiments and observations are strongly theory

Falsificationism, though, helped me to understand that induction is good for everyday life, but not for science. I learnt that it is possible to falsify someone’s theory or my theory be falsified, but Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ approaches made me understand that it is better not to abandon a theory even if it is falsified. Research programmes influenced me mostly, since the fundamental hypothesis of the hard core and the supplementary assumptions of the protective belt, can be better applied not only to physics, but also natural sciences. For me science has to be explained in an objective way, so the anarchistic theory of science did not influence me, because it talks about individual’s freedom and subjectivity. Finally, the modern approaches of Bayesianism and New Experimentalism did not satisfy me at all and they did not help me in order to define what science is. I strongly believe that an approach based on a theorem which is applied to gambling has no place in science and experiments cannot be theory