ipl-logo

Evaluating Operational Level Functions Of Operation Husky

1642 Words7 Pages

Operation Husky was the successful Allied conquest of the Axis controlled Island of Sicily. The campaign advanced the Allies’ strategic goals to take pressure off of Russia, open Allied shipping lanes in the Mediterranean, and coerce Italy to leave the Axis alliance. Husky also exposed operational level problems within the Allied force from initial planning through execution. This paper evaluates operational level functions of the Husky campaign using joint doctrine, senior officer’s opinion, and a white paper from GEN Martin Dempsey. There are two parts to this evaluation, the first is the function of command and control evaluated through the conduct of the mission command attributes intent, understanding, and trust. The second is evaluation …show more content…

U.S. service components overcome doctrinal differences through integration of a joint environment and create a synergistic effect. Fires are a lethal or nonlethal engagement through targeting a weapon system. Fires are joint when two or more services are using these effects when contesting an adversary. The integration of fires during Operation Husky was not well developed. Eisenhower and the service chiefs failed to integrate multiple capabilities of the air component, but the navy and army worked well together with some joint fires providing critical assistance in the early stages of the U.S. 7th Army assault. The air component did not use air apportionment with the other services, and was largely absent for joint fire support. Planners developed an arduous request process that when used was often ignored. The air component was not relied on for joint fire support of the maneuver element, to provide priority fires, or fires to surface units in contact. The air component did not perform offensive counter-air during D-Day landings against active Axis aircraft, fortunately, without significant effect to beach landings. Deficient joint airspace planning and control caused the deaths of American and British air crews and paratroopers while flying to drop zones. In the final days of the campaign, evaluation of employed fires on evacuating Axis …show more content…

The bi-national consensus to command by committee removed the principal command centric focus built on intent, and diminished decentralized decision making. Fires and movement and maneuver functions evaluations demonstrated evolving integration incorporating new capabilities comprising lethality of fires, fires air apportionment, and coordination of paratrooper delivery. The separate service planning and bi-national committee compromise contributed to parallel operations not integrated, or synergized to enhance available force

Show More
Related
747 Words | 3 Pages

Starting in mid-January to mid-February, there was interest in assaulting the Shahikot Valley in the Paktia province of Afghanistan by employing U.S. ground combat forces as part as an operation due to intelligence reports suggesting that enemy forces, which included al Qaeda and the Taliban where in the stages of reoccupying the area to regroup its forces after its sustaining defeats during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. A debate between intelligence agencies on whether the enemy troops would be on the valley floor or on the hills. Well before the battle, early intelligence estimates, which drew on HUMINT and other sources, claimed that nearly 1,000 al Qaeda and Taliban forces might be present in the Shahikot Valley but then were lowered to about 200 to 300 personnel (Baranick, Binnendijk , Kuglar, 2009). They also concluded that they were mostly living in the valley’s villages, rather than deployed in the surrounding mountains and ridgelines as they thought they would be from the more tactical

Read More
1542 Words | 7 Pages

On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective

Read More
1069 Words | 5 Pages

Principles Of Mission Command: Operation Anaconda. SSG Alicea-Sevilla, Manuel Army Sustainment University SLC: 91/94 CMF Class 23-024 SFC Hercules & Mr. Burger Date:20230428 Introduction/Abstract The essay analyzes the application of the seven command principles by the United States military during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002. Primarily, an analysis on General Hagenbeck's operational leadership and decision-making through the lens of the seven command principles to evaluate the extent to which he adhered to them.

Read More
2222 Words | 9 Pages

General Macarthur and his plan to attack Inchon was a daring endeavor however, it was one that was analyzed greatly and used the tenants of mission command. General Macarthur used his considerable leadership skills and understanding of mission command to develop a winning strategy for the landing at Inchon, skills that all leaders should know and use. Mission command is a powerful tool when used correctly and General Macarthur was a master at

Read More
970 Words | 4 Pages

Summerall is credited with using massed artillery fires in support of the infantry (p.45, ACAC, 1999). The initial assault on St. Mihiel began at 0100 in the morning on the 12th of September 1918. After the planned four- hour bombardment, which was characterized as neutralization fires using 168 guns, the purpose of the field artillery changed, and at 0500 on the same day light artillery pieces began using rolling fires in front of the infantry (p.24, ACAC, 1999). Gen. Summerall had adopted the method of advancing in echelons and leading each echelon with a barrage of artillery and put his plan into action during the fight for St. Mihiel (p.45, ACAC, 1999). Gen. Summerall’s tactics can still be seen today and is often used in a deliberate attack scenario where a forward observer will use decreasingly smaller rounds and the shifting of indirect fires while friendly elements approach an objective, often called “echelonment of fires”.

Read More
708 Words | 3 Pages

Returning to the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to assume command as the brigade commander brings me much joy to be reunited with great Non-Commission Officers and Officers that I have previously served with. Unfortunately, this brigade is no longer the brigade I remember when I commanded a battalion within the 4th ABCT not so long ago. In the last 30 days, I have had the opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade. During my observation, I believe the critical leadership problem in the 4th ABCT’s is the lack of vision for the brigade. Therefore, this critical problem has led to other challenging issues within the brigade.

Read More
1005 Words | 5 Pages

Retrieved September 25, 2016, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/10/nyregion/fire-chief-challenges-new-york-emergency-plan.html?_r=1 Phibbs, W. M., & Snawder, M. A. (2014, November). Embracing the Incident Command System Above and Beyond Theory. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved September 25, 2016, from

Read More
1363 Words | 6 Pages

American troops lacked centralized command between small units. “Supporting fires, including those controlled by airborne forward air controllers, were often directed at the platoon level. Eventually human error led to five attacks by supporting aircraft on the 3/187th, killing seven and wounding 53. Four of the incidents involved Cobra gunship helicopters, which in one case were more than 1 kilometer (0.62 mi) away from their intended target.” (Wiest, 2007).

Read More
1475 Words | 6 Pages

Therefore, he dispatched his 2nd Brigade Commander, Colonel Anderson, to gather as much information as possible, assess the situation, then report back describing the conditions in order for Major General Petraeus to lead, and direct his units in Mosul. This paper explores the aspects he used to lead, direct, and assess the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul. Moreover, how General Petraeus was able to utilize artful

Read More
1128 Words | 5 Pages

By definition, “mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations,” according to ADRP 5-0. Mission command is about knowing when to change the task to fit the purpose. This paper is intended to analyze the mission command of one side of the battle, focusing on the commander’s role in the operations process. The Battle of Bunker Hill was the most important battle of the American Revolution because of Colonel Prescott’s superior command and control.

Read More
783 Words | 4 Pages

They escorted the bombers to their targets and back to the

Read More
1460 Words | 6 Pages

Para 2). Two American and one British airborne division were placed at the western and eastern points of the attack zone. Due to poor

Read More
1497 Words | 6 Pages

The Army’s air establishment consisted of 131 officers, practically all pilots and students pilots (11 were reservist on active duty), and 1,087 enlisted men. The first Army aviation office had been set up as the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps on 1 August 1907; and since 1914 control had been vested in the Aviation Section of that corps. With so small office corps the Aviation Section was unable to furnish direction for the expansion program or commanders for the combat units. It turned naturally to civilian source for leadership, and while many of the industrial and professional men who were recruited were able enough, few even had knowledge of aviation requirements or of military procedure. A ready source of technical advice existed in the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and early in the war a number of joint Army-Navy aeronautical committees were establish.

Read More
428 Words | 2 Pages

This kind of moronic planning, design and execution of an un-professional Air War, with arrogant ignorance of even the basic tenets of the Doctrines of Air Power, thrust upon an Air Force that was only in name independent, but for all practical purposes used as flying artillery, resulted in the tragic debacle for the otherwise valiant Luftwaffe. This worked to the advantage of the

Read More
1261 Words | 6 Pages

Stealth and precision provided the capability to achieve control over Iraq’s core systems. Furthermore, attacks by A-10s and other coalition aircraft against Iraqi armor units drove many enemy fighters to desert or surrender, that by the time coalition ground forces swept across Kuwait, they did not encounter much resistance. Moreover, training exercises and new technologies enabled parallel and synchronous attack like never seen before that paralyzed the Iraqi leadership and fielded forces. To put this into perspective, during ODS, more targets were struck within one day than all of 8th AF struck in 1942 and 1943.

Read More

More about Evaluating Operational Level Functions Of Operation Husky

Related Topics

Open Document