Evaluating Operational Level Functions Of Operation Husky

Operation Husky was the successful Allied conquest of the Axis controlled Island of Sicily. The campaign advanced the Allies’ strategic goals to take pressure off of Russia, open Allied shipping lanes in the Mediterranean, and coerce Italy to leave the Axis alliance. Husky also exposed operational level problems within the Allied force from initial planning through execution. This paper evaluates operational level functions of the Husky campaign using joint doctrine, senior officer’s opinion, and a white paper from GEN Martin Dempsey. There are two parts to this evaluation, the first is the function of command and control evaluated through the conduct of the mission command attributes intent, understanding, and trust. The second is evaluation

U.S. service components overcome doctrinal differences through integration of a joint environment and create a synergistic effect. Fires are a lethal or nonlethal engagement through targeting a weapon system. Fires are joint when two or more services are using these effects when contesting an adversary. The integration of fires during Operation Husky was not well developed. Eisenhower and the service chiefs failed to integrate multiple capabilities of the air component, but the navy and army worked well together with some joint fires providing critical assistance in the early stages of the U.S. 7th Army assault. The air component did not use air apportionment with the other services, and was largely absent for joint fire support. Planners developed an arduous request process that when used was often ignored. The air component was not relied on for joint fire support of the maneuver element, to provide priority fires, or fires to surface units in contact. The air component did not perform offensive counter-air during D-Day landings against active Axis aircraft, fortunately, without significant effect to beach landings. Deficient joint airspace planning and control caused the deaths of American and British air crews and paratroopers while flying to drop zones. In the final days of the campaign, evaluation of employed fires on evacuating Axis

The bi-national consensus to command by committee removed the principal command centric focus built on intent, and diminished decentralized decision making. Fires and movement and maneuver functions evaluations demonstrated evolving integration incorporating new capabilities comprising lethality of fires, fires air apportionment, and coordination of paratrooper delivery. The separate service planning and bi-national committee compromise contributed to parallel operations not integrated, or synergized to enhance available force