Gary Varner's Biocentric Individualism

In this paper I will be considering what exactly environmentalism is by looking at the mission statement of Friends of the Earth (FOE). FOE’s mission statement rests on three principles: sustainability, connectivity and systemic change. Their mission statement holds them not only to protecting the environment but also to creating a just world, championing the social and economic rights of people too. These principles guide FOE to hold that all forms of life have inherent worth and also that resources ought to be used in a responsible manner. These views represent a version of Gary Varner’s Biocentric Individualism because it recognizes the inherent value of all living things and holds humans as especially important. In this paper I will argue

An ecofeminist would object to the premise that humans are morally more important because of their ability to have ground projects by showing that the premise operates within an oppressive conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination and so we should not accept the conclusion that it derives. A logic of domination states, “for any X and Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is morally justified in subordinating Y” (Warren, 159). An ecofeminist would claim that by asserting the moral superiority of beings with ground projects we would be justifying the subordination of beings without ground projects. For example, if I have a ground project to become a world famous taxidermist then my killing of animals and stuffing them would be morally justified. An ecofeminist would object that this thinking justifies oppression of non-human and non-sentient things through using a logic of domination that establishes an oppressive conceptual framework. Furthermore, it justifies subordination on the grounds that some group posses a certain characteristic while another does not (Warren, 159). The problem with this way of thinking is that ground projects don’t create any morally relevant distinction between those that have them and those that don’t (Warren, 159). Therefore, if we accept this objection we can conclude that biocentric individualism should not be adopted and that if FOE’s mission statement reflects biocentric

Indeed, if satisfying a ground project destroys the environment such that no one is able to complete their own ground projects then we would be justified in preventing the original ground project and safeguarding non-human beings from further subordination. Second, a biocentric individualistic view, like that of an ecofeminist’s, is structurally pluralistic because it “presupposes and maintains difference… it affirms that humans are both members of an ecological community (in some respects) and different from it (in other respects)” (Warren, 166). Thus biocentric individualism acknowledges and respects the differences between beings with and without ground projects and the difference in moral consideration is not one based on purely arbitrary or subordinating terms. The ecofeminist objection therefore does not undermine my original argument because we can see that by appealing to biocentric individualism it acknowledges and respects the moral differences between beings with and without ground projects. Furthermore, we would not necessarily have to subordinate non-human beings because doing so could jeopardize the ability to satisfy ground projects in the future. Since this objection does not undermine my argument we can still