How Does Rene Descartes Still Exist

Descartes is concerned about knowledge in the wake of the scientific revolution. He believed that the sciences were already ahead of him, so he needed to provide foundations for knowledge that were undoubtedly firm and lasting. In order to do so, he had to disprove things. He doubted the corporeal world and math, through a methodological doubt known as radical doubt. He needed to doubt what is present to the senses, anything bodily in nature, and anything with physical components. This included things related to science, like physics, astronomy, and medicine. Through his method of doubt, which doubted things like senses, the solid foundation, and particular implications, he was able to establish that life and consciousness do actually exist

However, I have noticed that the senses are sometimes deceptive; and it is a mark of prudence never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even more.”

By saying this, he makes the argument that our senses are deceiving us. What we once thought existed, might not actually exist. For example, if were were to hold a pencil, who is to say that the pencil actually exists? Descartes questions the existence of the pencil, our hands that hold the pencil, and ultimately, our own body that contains our hands. He argues that it is possible that our mind is perceiving the pencil to be a figment of our imagination. Because Descartes believes that the mind is ultimately responsible for imagining the existence of corporeal things (e.g. the pencil), then he is able to assume that humans are constantly dreaming (so that he can doubt it). Descartes

Descartes slips into solipsism after he establishes his solid foundation because he begins to be skeptical of everything external to him. He believes that we cannot doubt our own existence, but we can doubt anything that exists independently of us because an evil genius can be deceiving us. He refers to his wax example when establishing the idea of solipsism because he says,
“But what am I to say about this mind, that is, about myself? For as yet I admit nothing else to be in me over and above the mind. What, I ask, am I who seem to perceive this wax so distinctly? Do I not know myself not only much more truly and with greater certainty, but also much more distinctly and evidently? For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, certainly from this same fact that I see the wax it follows much more evidently that I myself exist. For it could happen that what I see is not truly