Ideology, Operational Objectives, And Violent Activates Of Hamas

2250 Words9 Pages

Kimberly Drielak
Hamas
May 31, 2015

Table of Contents
Section 1: History, Ideology, Operational Objectives, and Violent Activates of Hamas 3

Section 1: History, Ideology, Operational Objectives, and Violent Activates of Hamas

Hamas is an acronym of Harakat al-Muqawma al-Islamiyya, which is Arabic for “Islamic Resistance Movement.” In the 1990’s this social movement began its transformation into a terrorist organization. Hamas arose from the Muslim fundamentalist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt (Mannes, 2004). The Muslim Brotherhood, which engaged primarily in social and religious work, did not join the resistance against the Israeli …show more content…

The organization’s leadership believes that through sustained violence, it can produce it, and that no peace process can realistically yield this result. (Klein, 2015). Hamas supported this objective with a campaign of violence against Israel. However, Hamas took a different approach when obtaining enough political support to defeat Fatah. “Although Fatah probably retains a more durable base of political support than Hamas, the fact that one out of six Palestinians receives some sort of social service from Hamas gives it an edge from day to day. The disintegration of the PA’s sources of such assistance, which were never very efficient, imparted even greater political momentum to Hamas”. (Klein, 2015) There has been a significant strategic impact of acts of terrorism executed on behalf of Hamas. Hamas has made its mark, not merely as a terrorist organization, but also as a unique political Islamic movement that seeks to make comprehensive change in domestic policy. Hamas, acting as a traditional and not-so-traditional terrorist group, has had quite a successful impact on Middle Eastern politics and political relations, if regrettably in very violent manner. (Wasylciw, …show more content…

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