Kant's Absolute View Of Human Morality

In this essay I will explore Kant’s absolute view of the human moral. Kant uses examples to explain what it means to be moral, and if that moral behavior is universal. Kant argues that in order for an action to be considered good, all its intentions must be good as well. We undertake tasks because we think they will serve as a moral duty. Kant argues that a moral law that is almost innate in all of us holds us all—there is an unwritten code that most of us try and follow. On page 860, Kant writes, “…there is an estimation of worth which far outweighs all the worth of whatever is recommended by the inclinations, and that the necessity that I act from pure respect for the practical law constitutes my duty. To duty every other motive must give

On page 886, Kant writes, “we assume that we are free in the order of efficient causes so that we can conceive of ourselves as subject to moral laws in the order of ends. And then we think of ourselves subject to these laws because we have ascribed freedom of the will to ourselves.” Kant then further points out that this argument is indeed a circular one. Autonomy is in and of itself described as freedom and self-legislation. I believe that what Kant is trying to say here is that humans think they are free because of our own morals, but the morals themselves are based on freedom. The argument is revolving around the fact that humans do not know how to perfectly divide freedom and law. On page 888, Kant states, “the Idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world.” I believe that this is a direct statement in saying that Kant sees a difference between the ordinary, which I think to be the world seen though the senses, and the intelligible world. I believe that Kant is trying to say that we are all apart of the sensible world, but true freedom—even though we are all subject to the sensible world—lies in the intelligible worlds. In the intelligible world, freedom is a priori. As Kant writes on page 889, “…thus rendering a priori synthetic propositions on which all knowledge of a system of nature rests”—as he speaks of the intelligible