Kant's Cosmopolitanism Analysis

Cosmopolitanism as an idea is as broad and at times dangerously as vague as the term identity. Therefore, it is essential to deconstruct it into one focused teleological approach in order to understand the manner in which this desired approach can be applied to an understanding of identity construction and identity clashes within and between the EU and its ‘new’ member states, respectively. With regards to this desired approach, this will be an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism.

In an edited version of Kant’s seminal publication “Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History”, Allen W. Wood (2006;261) highlights that the central premise underpinning the term cosmopolitanism is that human

The emphasis here is on a cosmopolitanism built upon the principles of humanity globally, and not on “nationality, localised political affiliation or place of birth” (46). When addressing the idea of cosmopolitanism within the context of sovereignty and human rights, Thomas Pogge (2010;114) asserts that three characteristics of cosmopolitanism are inherent throughout every interpretation of the term; that it involves individualism, wherein human beings, and not delineations of human beings such as ethnicities, religions or nationalities take precedent; that universality of meaning and importance applies to each human being, and not a specific category of human beings; and finally, that generality of the manner in which people are concerned for others is not limited to their fellow citizens but to every person regardless of nationality, religion or affiliation. These three constants as Pogge has outlined them in the context of human beings and institutional rights are integral to obtaining an understanding of cosmopolitanism in that they reflect the European Union’s central characteristic; that it transcends the nation-state and, ideally, every notion attached to the

Specifically, in the moral aspect equal importance is attached to every individual’s needs, from their happiness to the means available to them (115). Pogge continues by theorising two subsets of moral cosmopolitanism relating to how moral constraints are maintained. On the one hand moral cosmopolitanism is upheld by institutional cosmopolitanism, which essentially entails the normative standards established on an institutional level to “regulate human interactions” (115). On the other hand moral cosmopolitanism is upheld by interactional cosmopolitanism, which maintains that the level to which citizens’ equal moral concerns and rights are protected depends on their ability to practice and uphold those rights in their interactions with one