Michael Sherry's Theory Of Bomber Command

Bomber Command Was the strategy of America and Britain, of strategic bombing of critical points of German infrastructure, an effective and valid direction? This is a question that several have asked, and few have tried to answer. There are two historians in specific that have attempted to undertake the task to evaluate the decisions of Britain and the United States with regards to air bombing during World War II. One author, whose name is Richard Overy, brings a much stronger argument in favor of the decisions made by the Allies than that of the other author, whose name is Michael Sherry. Mr. Overy brought several good points to the table to validate his argument in favor of the decisions made by the Allies during World War II. One of the

He opens his writing by stating, “The leaders and technicians of the American Air Force were driven by technological fanaticism – a pursuit of destructive ends expressed, sanctioned, and disguised by the organization and application of technological means.” This statement is the foundation of the ideology that Sherry believed motivated the actions of the allies in regards to bomber command. This is just a drawn-out way of saying that the allies’ goal in World War II was actually the destruction of Germany, and that the allies masks these motives by bombing this nation in the name of strategic advancement. The issue with a statement like this is trying to read intentions into the actions of people based on the outcome of what they did. Without supernatural abilities, it is impossible to accurately tell what the counsels are that take place inside the heart of men. Sherry states that the actual underlying goal of technological advancement in air warfare was the desire of the allies to have a worldwide Air Force. Since this idea was never clearly stated by the allies, it was easier to state that the goal of stopping the German threat through strategic bombing was a much more palatable idea for the public. Sherry brought to light the reality that the general public of the Allied nations would not be willing to get on board with the idea of any further imperialism or destruction on the global scene because of the scars and wounds of World War I and World War II respectively. Assuming the allies were aware of this truth, if they wanted to accomplish their goal of global control of the air, they would have to come up with reasoning that the public could get on board with where the and justify the means. This again seems to be another area where Sherry is making decisions based on the assumed intentions of the leaders of the Allied powers at the time.