Nuclear Myths And Political Realities Summary

Alliances : Nuclear Myths and Political Realities by. Stephen M. Walt

The work from Stephen M. Walt starts off by pointing out how the failed understanding of the concept of 'deterrence' has made the general public more uncomfortable with nuclear deterrence than before and that the leading individuals is failing to understand a nuclear weapon's strategic implications even after 40 years since the first practical use of an atomic bomb. For this reason it is focused on applying nuclear reasoning to military policies and contrasting the logic based on conventional weapons and nuclear weapons.

The wide spread uneasiness regarding nuclear weapons is caused from the nature and requirement of deterrence, claims the author. This misunderstanding

Such, however, may be seen as a giant leap of faith based on thin air for the Soviet government. Primarily, launching thousands of missiles in a single volley to paralyze a nation's security system is dangerous and unlikely. It would mean the government would have total trust on the intelligence agency, that they have found the exact location of almost all of their intended targets. Also, there is no guarantee all missiles will land or the attacked nation not striking back on warning. Not to mention through, the distinction between counterforce and countervalue strikes also proves this argument to be futile. Because the Soviet fired their first volley entirely counterforce, does not mean the retaliation will be entirely counterforce. It cannot be predicted and the intended targets cannot be identified. No nation would be willing to run such stupendous