Operational Art: Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP)

Debate over the theory of war and warfare has occurred for centuries. The United States Army has opted to frame theory of war and warfare in the form of Operational Art. Operational Art first made its doctrinal debut in Army doctrine in 1982. It has experienced a number of revisions over the last thirty-three years. The most recent description of Operational Art is found in the Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0. ADP 3-0 defines Operational Art as the “pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.” According to ADP 3-0, Operational Art provides the cognitive link between action (tactics) and objective (strategy). It also provides the US Army with a theory to solve problems associated

First it bridges a conceptual void between strategic objectives and tactical tasks. Operational art provides a common framework to plan large-scale operations in time, space, and purpose without prescribing a formulaic method for commanders to follow. It also provides a common lexicon with operationally attuned joint partners. Battlefield complexity requires commanders and staff to think about how to synchronize tactical actions in phased operations, over days, weeks, and months. Operational Art provides commanders and planners with focus of what campaigns and operations require synchronization and when they have to occur in order to meet strategic objectives. Additionally, battlefields boundaries are no longer defined by a map and compass. For example, the inclusion of cyber warfare requires the virtual and physical battlefield to be synchronized in time and space for the first time in history. Operational Art is a sufficient method to cognitively synchronize various battlefields with joint, interagency, and intergovernmental partners to achieve our political and strategic