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How To Write A Rhetorical Analysis Of General Milley's Speech

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“Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more,” 1 King Henry heartened his men into a bleak and terrible struggle, and comparably, General Milley spurs our modern military to embrace an indefinite and violent future. GEN Milley’s speech to the Association of the US Army2 creates evocative imagery of isolated units, hunted by technologically and numerically-matched enemy forces. His message is clear; the joint force must innovate and change to win approaching wars. Despite this claim that new techniques lead to victory, his message aligns with current doctrinal tenets from Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0: Operations. I intend to show that the tenet of depth not only supports GEN Milley’s remarks, but also aids our ability …show more content…

GEN Milley’s remarks fall in line with the doctrinal template for commanders to encourage and prepare their subordinate leaders to take initiative as new circumstances develop. Opponents of this view may ask “why would we encourage our members to defy orders under any circumstance, especially on the battlefield?” This counterargument brings up concerns that subordinate units will detract from operational depth if they fail to follow the well-coordinated orders of their commander. Certainly, apprehension that too much initiative may disrupt coordinated friendly efforts is valid, but the argument does not account for a dynamic enemy force. A commander bases his specific plans on the intelligence estimate of the enemy force, but until his unit defeats them, it is unlikely that he will gain the full understanding of their capabilities. According to doctrine “commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting. Without action, seizing the initiative is impossible.” 3 Hence, it stands that true operational depth arises through the actions of the lowest levels who find, overwhelm, and exploit the enemy weaknesses. GEN Milley indicates that the goal is not for commanders to have perfect plans, but for the United States to

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