Pojman Death Penalty

Topic: Moral Permissibility of Death Penalty

Thesis: Pojman 's anecdotal evidence that the death penalty deters potential criminals does not sufficiently show that the death penalty is permissible.

The supporting reasons or pieces of evidence are:

(i) Pojman argues that what people (including potential criminals) fear more will have a greater deterrent effect on them. People (including potential criminals) fear death more than they do any other humane punishment. The death penalty is a humane punishment. Therefore, people (including potential criminals) will be deterred more by the death penalty than by other humane punishment (Pojman, 1998).

(ii) The second premise assumes that potential criminals engage in risk assessment, which remains to be seen, especially for crimes that are committed in rage or defence. There is also no substantial evidence

Herrnstein and Wilson’s example of some cases of criminals, on the death penalty row, tried to reduce their sentences to life imprisonment may be atomistic to extend to the entire society or criminals to show that they fear the death penalty more than other humane punishment. Since this deterrence is not measurable, Bedau offered a moral principle that “unless there is a good reason for choosing a more rather than less severe punishment for a crime, the less severe penalty is to be preferred.” With that, choosing another humane punishment over the death penalty is more morally permissible. Pojman also conceded by stating that “it seems likely that the death penalty does not deter as much as it could due to its inconsistent and rare use” in reality. Even when the death penalty is carried out, it is shield away from the public’s eye; thus it does not produce any deterrence effects (Kramer,