Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Of 1969

On February 1972, President Richard Nixon met in Beijing with the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong. This was an important event that marked the end to the period since neither country had recognized the other. This trip did not happen overnight, however. This visit had taken three years to organize. Most importantly, this visit would be the start of the resumption of harmonious relations between China and the United States. On This subject, this paper intends to demonstrate how the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969, a direct consequence of the Sino-Soviet split, shaped U.S. foreign relations towards China. Most specifically, this paper will argue that the Sino-Soviet border conflict was one of the important factors

reactions and maneuvers to the Sino-Soviet border conflict, this paper will show that the Nixon administration was concerned about an escalation of the conflict into nuclear war, as well as a Soviet threat to the balance of power in the region. Additionally, the administration was also motivated by an interest in Chinese markets. For these reasons, the Nixon administration embarked in effort to signal Beijing that it wanted a new relationship. The paper trail from the period exposes a mutual agreement from both side for this relationship to occur, especially when the Taiwan issue came into play. Even though China and the Soviet Union are part of this history, however, this paper will mainly focus on the reactions and maneuvers of the U.S. government during this

The Sino-Soviet amicable relations went from disagreement and public bickering, to total departure and inimical conflict. By the mid-60s, the split was an undeniable and ever present fixture in the political landscape of East Asia. In fact, by February of 1962, the CIA was reporting that: “There is no longer much of a fundamental resolution of differences. In our view, the chances that such a split can be avoided in…are no better than even.” The split, as some authors have claimed, had an equal importance as the “Berlin Wall, The Cuban Missile Crisis, [and] the Second Vietnam War.” By now, it is extensively documented that ideological differences between Beijing and Moscow were at play when it came to the split. One of the favorite points of origins that historians like to point out as the cause for the split is Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization” speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956. In this speech, Khrushchev denounced the crimes committed by Stalin’s and the “cult of personality” that surrounded him. Mao Zedong himself claims, however, that the split had earlier roots than this: “Stalin wanted to prevent China from making revolution, saying that we should not have a civil war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, otherwise the