James Cameron (2014) From the Grass Roots to the Summit: The Impact of US Suburban Protest on US Missile-Defense Policy, 1968-72, The International History Review, 36:2, 342-362, DOL: 10.1080/07075332.2013.864693 In James Cameron’s “From the Grass Roots to the Summit” the major focus is on the influence of ordinary suburbanites (the grassroots) on the US performance at SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) commencing in 1969. In September of 1969 Sentinel, the Pentagon’s ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system, was announced by US Secretary of Defense McNamara as a defensive system designed to protect the US’ largest cities such as Boston, Seattle and Chicago from a potential nuclear attack from the People’s Republic of China. Massive outrage …show more content…
In 1969 Nixon announced a radical reform of Sentinel, naming it Safeguard. Many believe Nixon was heavily influenced by the protests to which the Illinois senator alone, on a weekly basis in 1969, received over 1,000 letters. Nixon moved the primary focus of his defense system to defending the nation’s existing minutemen silos against the Soviet Union’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force. However, the Soviet’s began a mass build up of ICBM’s putting the US in a bad position. Nixon had created a primary aim to arrest the growth of soviet offensive forces after the Soviets had agreed to arms control talks when Nixon had taken office. The opening US position at SALT would make a pact allowing both powers to build ABM’s to defend their nation’s capitals, the Soviet’s already having the existence of the Moscow missile. This alongside the US attempt at trading defensive superiority for Soviet offensive concessions was cut down by the domestic political constraints imposed by suburban protests. Due to suburban backlash, the utilization of Safeguard as a bargaining chip at SALT failed to occur. Cameron argues that it was ultimately a grassroots …show more content…
This row also showcased systemic changes in the transatlantic relationship in the 1970’s. This animosity between US President Carter and German Chancellor Schmidt is legendary. It seemed to have begun primarily with their debate over the German-Brazilian agreement on nuclear co-operation, which would have concluded with the export of a full nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil. The 1975 agreement was of great value to Western Germany, amounting near 12 billion marks and being the Federal Republics largest export deal to date. From the get go, Schmidt and Carter had different ideas about the uses and impact of nuclear energy. The US heavy-handedly pressured them to refrain from nuclear exports, specifically in the German-Brazilian deal. The US’ loud voice instilled the pact set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Until 1974 most nations had approached nuclear weapons and civilian uses of nuclear energy separately. Both sides in outlining their grievances towards each other often used article 4. “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The treaty still allowed the nuclear export nations to export