The trial court convicted Ms. Borne under 26 U.S.C. 5845(f)(3) and sentenced her to 12-months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the conviction was proper based on the evidence presented at trial. According to the court of appeals, the prosecution proved—beyond a reasonable doubt—that Ms. Borne’s items: (1) could be readily assembled in a destructive device and (2) were designed, or intended for use as a destructive device. This was a reversible error. A. The government failed to show the items could readily assemble into a weapon The government’s proof fails on the very first element of a proper §5845(f)(3) charge: evidence establishing the possessed items could readily create a destructive device. 26 U.S.C. §5845(f)(3). …show more content…
Id. As the court explained, reversal was appropriate here because though the dynamite could have been used in a device covered by 5845(f), the evidence showed Posnjak ultimately did not possess all the components necessary to construct such a device. Id. Similarly, this record contains no evidence that Ms. Borne possessed all of the necessary components to produce a destructive device. Therefore, because the items in question could not combine to produce any destructive device enumerated in 5845(f)(1) or (2), Ms. Borne’s conviction should be vacated. B. The government failed to establish the items actually in Ms. Borne’s possession could be objectively viewed as component parts to a destructive …show more content…
Borne actually possessed were designed to produce a device proscribed in §5845(f)(1) or (2). The hairspray was not limited to functioning as a fuel source, the matches were devised to light far more than just fuses and the cylinder, though unique, could clearly be adapted to numerous legal and commercial purposes. If fact, the record indicated that Mr. Triton produced an exact replica of this item for that very purpose. Further, there is no evidence that Ms. Borne knew about—much less possessed—the USB that the Fourteenth Circuit held to be “a completed weapon.” The record shows she did not actually possess the item at the time of the arrest, nor did she know about its existence at all for that matter. Therefore, the evidence fails to establish any comprehensible reason for believing Ms. Borne’s items explicitly fell within the statutory definition of destructive