If we want Unconventional Warfare (UW) to be successful, many entities must invest. The investment is initially paid through the educational foundation and vested interest of SOF (including SF personnel and support enablers), policy makers (including top Army officials and political officials), and the Intelligence Community (IC).
SOF works on the tactical level of a mission, but their influence can reach to the staff (division) level of a resistance movement or insurgency. Since we are the bottom branch of the totem pole, we see and hear the pulse of a resistance. I believe we may have problems hearing this pulse due to 15 years of relentless war where we honed our ability to teach small unit tactics while disregarding the roles of the underground and auxiliary through preparation of the environment. In addition to SOF, our enablers have a large education gap to our mission due to their investment. While our SF tabs invest our future in SOF, their “S” identifiers give them an affiliation. How is someone supposed to be part of a mission when they are on the sidelines? Their education to the intent of UW and inclusion to our effortscan enhance our legitimacy and credibility.
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Maxwell’s article, there is a lack of education and strategic investment at the top of the Army ladder. While SOF can advocate to the highest levels, UW isn’t an option readily used. Therefore, the learning curve for UW application is a challenge. Our top brass (including team leaders) must advocate for the appropriate use of UW. They must also teach the difference between a full UW campaign that incorporates the political sphere rather than only Special Forces. Since the initial phases of UW are primarily a 4th BN and OGA-centric mission, the political realm needs to understand the investment and ramifications of conducting UW without dismissing