Unintended Consequences Of Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is a “set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” (JP 5-0, I-5) The U.S. Government derives and then implements a national grand strategy to achieve policy objectives. Unintended outcomes from the execution of national grand strategy occur more often when the joint community is faced with an unforeseen crisis or a situation that developed with little to no warning. How can the Joint Planning and Execution Community minimize the risk of unintended consequences resulting from the employment of national power designed to achieve a desired political objective?

In this paper I will

Joint Planning guides the strategic

The invasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) into the Republic of Korea (ROK) on June 25th, 1950 is a well-studied intelligence failure. Although the intelligence community warned the U.S. administration of DPRK’s combat power build up along the border, it was widely believed that any action by the DPRK would require consent of the Soviet Union. Since there was no evidence of Soviet preparations for conflict, the community believe the risk of DPRK invasion was not imminent. (CIA, Two Strat Intel Mistakes) The even larger failure of the Joint Planning and Execution community of the time, was the underestimation of the importance China placed on having DPRK as a buffer to their border. The Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) were newly established by National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment, so this was their first time responding to a crisis situation. (History of the JCS, pg vii) Planners were not well prepared when the decision was made to assist the ROK in defending their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the JCS immediately made their first planning assumption; U.S. combat forces would assist in restoring the ROK border at the 38th parallel. (History of the JCS, pg 32) The assumption was confirmed on June 29th when President Truman and Secretary Acheson both clearly articulated that restoration of the border and peace on the peninsula was the U.S. political objective. (History, p. 95) The U.S. government, the Intelligence Community, and General Douglas MacArthur, underestimated the resolve of China to maintain DPRK a strategic buffer between themselves and the democracy established in the ROK. China recognized the likelihood of U.S. success against DPRK forces and began to develop their national strategy to defend against what they perceived as U.S. aggression that threatened Chinese sovereignty. In spite of a Soviet request that China not engage with the U.S. for