Case Brief: DPP v Jones (1999)
Facts
On 1st June 1995 a group of over twenty people were assembled on the verge of the A344, which was adjacent to Stonehenge. Prior to this an order had been made under section 14A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 which prohibited the holding of all "trespassory assemblies" in the specified area. The group was not being obstructive or hindering the public from using the road, however, the appellants Jones and Lloyd, refused to leave and were subsequently arrested and convicted for "taking part in a trespassory assembly" under section 14B (2) of the Public Order Act 1986. They appealed to Salisbury Crown Court and their conviction was quashed as the court deemed that they were reasonably using the highway . The Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) appealed to the Divisional Court who reinstated the defendants' convictions. Jones and Lloyd then appealed to the House of Lords.
Issues The court had to decide what the limits are relating to the public's right of access to the public highway. What the "particular purpose" for which the public has a right to use the public highway. Whether the public has the right of
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The judges decided that there is a right to reasonable activities on the highway , not just the right of passage. It was decided that reasonable activities included peaceful, non-obstructive assembly on the highway in certain cases, such as this one. The judges agreed that defining what consisted of a reasonable activity depended on the facts of each individual situation and in some cases a demonstration may be seen as trespassory if was not deemed to be reasonable. The judges also believed that the law could be extended , which would fit with the advancement of the country . Lord Hutton argued that common law recognises a right for members of the public to assemble together to express views and this is one of the fundamental rights of a democracy